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ABSTRACT 
 
Active and Knowledge-based Process Safety Incident Retrieval System. (August 2010) 
Sara Shammi Khan, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. M. Sam Mannan 
 
 The sustainability and continued development of the chemical industry is to a 
large extent dependent on learning from past incidents. The failure to learn from past 
mistakes is rather not deliberate but due to unawareness of the situation. Incident 
databases are excellent resources to learn from past mistakes; however, in order to be 
effective, incident databases need to be functional in disseminating the lessons learned to 
users. Therefore, this research is dedicated to improving user accessibility of incident 
databases. The objective of this research is twofold. The first objective is improving 
accessibility of the database system by allowing the option of word search as well as 
folder search for the users. This will satisfy research needs of users who are aware of the 
hazards at hand and need to access the relevant information. The second objective is to 
activate the database via integration of the database with an operational software. This 
will benefit research needs of users who are unaware of the existing hazards. 
Literature review and text mining of Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) 
database short reports are employed to develop an initial taxonomy, which is then 
refined and modified by expert review. The incident reports in MARS database is 
classified to the right folders in the taxonomy and implemented in a database system 
based on Microsoft Excel, where the users can retrieve information using folder search 
as well as word search option via a user friendly interface. 
A program coded in JAVA is prepared for integrating the incident database with a 
Management of Change (MOC) software prototype. A collection of keywords on 
hazardous substances and equipment is prepared. If the keywords exist in the MOC 
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interface, they will be highlighted, and with the click of a button, will return up to ten 
relevant incident reports. Using an active and knowledge-based system, people can learn 
from incidents and near-misses and will be more active to reduce the frequency of 
recurring incidents. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We cannot wait to learn from our own mistakes, thus, incident databases serve as 
invaluable resources to learn from mistakes made by others in the past, which are often 
accompanied with appalling consequences. Incident databases provide insights on what 
can go wrong with various processes, equipment, and operators and how devastating the 
outcome can be from a rather trivial hazard, which could go unseen during a Process 
Hazard Analysis (PHA).  
In order to be effectively useful incident databases should be comprehensive, functional, 
and should offer core learning from the past mistakes. A database is comprehensive, 
when it has a complete and accurate inventory of all different types of incidents. Core 
learning is gained whenever a detailed incident investigation is done to capture the root 
causes of the incidents and the results are well documented. Finally, for it to be 
functional, a database should be well structured and should be easily accessible to the 
users. 
The proposed research is dedicated to improving the functionality of incident databases 
by: 
1. Giving structure to the database by means of an intelligent incident taxonomy; 
2. Providing a ‘word search’ as well as a ‘folder search’ system for users, thus 
enhancing the information accessibility; and 
3. Integrating incident database to an operational software thereby converting it to 
an ‘active’ system, which can direct users to the incident information of interest. 
 
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of the journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry 
Research. 
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1.1    Motivation and Objective 
The sustainability and continued development of the chemical industry is to a large 
extent dependent on learning from past incidents, which is evident by the repeated 
mistakes in design and operation leading to the recurring incidents.1, 2 As any other 
industry, chemical industry strives to eliminate hazards and reduce incidents, since 
incidents are often tagged along with enormous financial losses and human casualties, 
which also diminish reputation of the industry. Consequently the failure to learn from 
past mistakes has significant consequences. 
In the context of potential hazards that exist in chemical process industry, there are two 
categories of unawareness or lack of knowledge: the first is ‘knowing that you don’t 
know’ the second is ‘not knowing that you don’t know’. 3 Both of these categories incur 
hazard, however the second is more undesirable, because unawareness of the potential 
danger eliminates the opportunity to research, identify and react appropriately to reduce 
or eradicate the hazard.3 Therefore in improving process safety data systems, the 
objective of this research is twofold: 
1. The first objective is to improve the traditional database search system by 
structuring the database through classification of the incident reports in an 
intelligent taxonomy. The taxonomy stored in a database and the incident 
summaries classified and assigned to the respective nodes of the taxonomy tree, 
will allow folder searching to enhance accessibility for the users. The resulting 
knowledge-base would benefit the research needs of users, who are already 
aware of the potential hazards of the process setting.  
2. The second objective is to transform the incident knowledgebase to an ‘active’ 
system, where the passive users will be alerted of unknown hazards by the 
system. This transformation will be done by integrating the database with an 
operational software – specifically a Management of Change (MOC) software 
prototype for this research, as shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Diagram showing the active functioning of the database through integration of the standalone 
incident database with MOC software prototype 
Having an incident database with its unique guided search system and modern 
information retrieval techniques and linking it with operational software would provide a 
powerful tool and would improve safety and hence reduce costs. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1    Existing Databases 
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) have developed an incident database to 
share incident information among members and enhance lessons learned. This unique 
database called Process Safety Incident Database (PSID) has undergone numerous 
upgrades and now offers a web-based application, which enables accessibility by any 
PSID participant at anytime, anywhere.3 Among other features that enhances 
functionality, such as data quality, potential of constant growth, security of data and 
confidentiality of data contributor, database management, and web accessibility, PSID 
also provides a conventional well-developed query system. The query system includes a 
few built in features such as the two dimensional (2-D) cross plot, whereby the user can 
plot any two data fields against each other and view statistical relationships.3 This 
feature is useful to learn the current industry trends and to efficiently allocate resources 
in order to minimize or prevent losses. In addition, PSID offers pre-programmed lists of 
topics that are very useful for inexperienced users, who can utilize this list to search for 
topics of interest. This list can also be customized by experienced users, who would like 
to keep their common search topics saved for quick access.  
The database search system developed in this research is similar to that of CCPS-PSID 
in the way that it offers folder search and word search. However, the PSID has a single 
level of folders (keyword list) in the hierarchy, after the broad divisions of type of 
operation, chemical involved, phase of operation, initiating event, incident type, 
contributing factors, equipment type, and incident cost. In this research, the folders are 
arranged in a hierarchy up to a maximum of four levels. Moreover, word search within a 
folder has also been included for the search system, which further improves searching 
capabilities. 
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Some of the existing incident databases that are open to public or accessible by Mary 
Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center (MKOPSC) members have been reviewed to 
analyze and compare the information retrieval options they provide. These databases are 
listed as follows: 
Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance System (HSEES) 
The HSEES database is established and maintained by the Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry (ATSDR). Currently, there are fifteen participating state health 
departments that provide information on release events that fall under the definition of 
HSEES event. A HSEES event is any release of a hazardous substance that require 
decontamination and cleanup according to federal, state, or local law, or any threatened 
release that results in public action, such as evacuation.4 HSEES however excludes any 
petroleum release event from reporting.  
The available HSEES database is stored in Microsoft Access© format, where all the 
features for sorting data, customized queries to find data of a certain attribute, and word 
search capabilities that the database management software provides, is possible. 
Environmental Protection Agency - Risk Management Program (EPA-RMP) 
RMP 5-year Incident History database is maintained by the Environmental Protection 
Agency and covers incidents resulting in fatalities, injuries, and environmental or 
property damage involved with fixed facilities that store, use, or produce certain 
chemicals above a threshold quantity.5 The data can be obtained in a CD in an 
application based on Microsoft Access. 
National Response Center (NRC) 
NRC serves as the single national point of contact for reporting all chemical, oil, 
biological, and radiological releases anywhere in the United States and its territories.6 
Manned by Coast Guard personnel NRC maintains 24 hours per day, 365 days per year 
telephone watch. The personnel enter incident reports obtained via telephone into the 
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Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) and relay the report to the designated 
Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC).6 The collected data is made available to the 
general public online through the NRC website under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA). NRC being the sole point of initial reporting for all type of discharges, the 
database is quite large and the data is not of the highest quality as the reporting has to be 
done within a short time frame, when people are dealing with the emergency and may 
not have all the information.  
The NRC-IRIS online query system allows narrowing down search results relevant to 
specific criteria as listed below: 
o NRC Report Number 
o Call Type 
o Incident Date 
o Location County 
o City 
o State  
o Suspected Responsible Company 
o Type of Incident 
o Medium Affected 
o Material Involved 
Thus, search result for the database can be refined by filling in the required criteria in the 
query form. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
As an agency of the Department of Labor, OSHA’s role is to assure the safety and health 
of American workers and prevent work-related injuries, illnesses, and fatalities by 
setting and enforcing standards.7 OSHA also provides information on safety and health 
and educate, train and assist employers and workers to follow standards in order to keep 
a safe workplace. OSHA maintains an online database of incident investigation 
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summaries. The summaries are in text form and can be queried through word search of 
the abstract or description of the incident. Besides word search they also allow searching 
by keywords and by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The following is a 
list of the query fields in the OSHA online database: 
o Description 
o Abstract 
o Keyword 
o Display (fatality only) 
o SIC 
o OSHA Office 
o Start Date 
o End Date 
o Inspection Number 
OSHA incident investigation reports comprise mostly of personnel safety or ‘hard hat’ 
safety, since OSHA is concerned about all kinds of incident in the workplace. Keyword 
searching of the reports reveals that the keywords are not always efficiently tagged and 
query through keywords returns many irrelevant results.  
Hazardous Material Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) and Integrated Pipeline 
Information System (IPIS) 
HMIRS and IPIS are maintained by US DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA). DOT’s HMIRS database is the primary source of national 
incident data for hazardous materials transportation excluding pipelines. The data is 
collected from the carriers of dangerous goods through their reporting of dangerous 
goods incidents.8 The database is downloadable from their website in comma separated 
value (CSV) format. HMIRS also maintains an extensive online query system to search 
incidents up to past ten years.9  The query fields return categorical results and can be 
divided into six main categories: 
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o General incident information, which includes date and location of incident, mode 
and phase of transportation, carrier/reporter information 
o Hazardous material name, including hazardous class and identification number. 
o Packaging information 
o Incident cause 
o Incident consequence, including fatalities and injuries, fire, explosion, etc. 
o Others, such as report number, container code, incident severity etc. 
IPIS is the primary source for pipeline safety data reported by pipeline operators.9 The 
database is downloadable from their website in CSV format and is divided into three sub 
databases: liquid pipeline; gas distribution; and gas transmission and gathering. 
Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) 
MARS database was established to manage major accident information submitted by the 
European Union (EU) member countries to the European Commission in agreement to 
the Seveso Directive.10 The reporting system allows two different formats: ‘short report’ 
forms to be filled for immediate notification of incidents and ‘full report’ to be prepared 
after complete investigation of the incident. The short reports are available in an online 
database and are open to public. The reports are mainly text based with some categorical 
fields. The text fields are: 
o Accident title 
o Accident description 
o Site description 
o Installation/unit description 
o Substance involved 
o Causes of the accident 
o Consequences 
o Emergency response 
o Lessons learned 
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The query system allows searching by incident date, legislation type, industry type, 
event type and full text search. The short reports comprise of only 10% of the number of 
the full accident reports and they are at times incomplete since these were reported when 
incident investigation has not been completed and the causes are unknown.10 However 
the text description gives further insight on the causes and lessons learned and because 
of its concise format, it is ideal for text mining applications. Text mining of these reports 
can reveal unique words and relationship between these words, which can help in the 
incident taxonomy building process. 
2.2    Existing Taxonomies 
Chung and Jefferson11 implemented an improved fuzzy search method that can exploit 
all available information in a database by returning not only the results that match a user 
defined query, but also those topics that have some relation to the query. To implement 
the fuzzy search method in an incident database, four incident classification hierarchies 
have been developed for the attributes operation, equipment, cause, and consequence. 
These classification hierarchies serving the sole purpose of supporting calculation of 
efficient Goodness of Fit (GOF) value (similarity score of the target data and the actual 
data) have been readjusted and extensively used wherever appropriate in building the 
taxonomy proposed for this research. 
Anand12 has proposed an equipment classification hierarchy similar to Chung and 
Jefferson’s classification. This taxonomy was used to generalize type of equipment into 
broad categories and used for data analysis to build a decision support system that would 
alert decision makers of potential hazards involving a chemical-equipment combination. 
OSHA has adopted a new Globally Harmonized System (GHS)13 approach to hazard 
classification, labels and safety data in order to increase the quality and consistency of 
information provided to employers, workers, and chemical users. OSHA GHS classifies 
chemicals according to their health and physical hazards. The taxonomy proposed for 
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this research follows the OSHA GHS classification of chemicals but also includes 
classification by the state of the chemicals and other pertinent classes drawn from 
various sources. 
Markowski14 has developed classifications of several attributes in his work to improve 
and extend the application of Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) for the process 
industry. Method for incident scenario generation has been studied in his work, which 
resulted in the development of databases for selection of hazardous process, incident 
event, and layers of protection. These databases consist of classifications of different 
attributes namely, equipment, activity, hazardous substances, layers of protection, and 
causal factors, such as, process upsets, technical failure, human error, management 
oversights, and external events. The taxonomy as proposed in this research is partially 
based on Markowski’s classifications. 
Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for Industries (ARAMIS) project, sponsored 
by the European Commission has defined a very comprehensive methodology for risk 
assessment. The method employs bow-tie diagrams as shown in Figure 2, to identify all 
major accidents assuming that the safety barriers are not in place or are inefficient.15 
Then the safety barriers are taken into account and evaluated to see if they are 
appropriate for the expected safety function. Finally, the evaluation of the probability of 
failure of the safety barriers enables to assess the incident frequency. 
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Figure 2. Complete bow-tie with identification of prevention or mitigation safety functions. (Adapted 
from Dianous and Fiévez,15 and Hale et. al16) 
The ARAMIS project was in progress from 2001 to 2004 and prescribed some general 
classifications of equipment (16 categories), hazardous substances type, and critical 
event type (12 general categories). Also, 14 generic fault trees have been developed for 
different critical event types that can result from different combination of the defined 
equipment and hazardous material type. The fault trees start with the ‘undesirable 
events’ that can lead to the critical event (top event) via ‘detailed direct causes’, ‘direct 
causes’, and ‘necessary and sufficient causes’ stages, which depict the sequence of 
failure events. The event trees can be developed from the critical event onward with the 
aid of prescribed matrices, which leads up to the possible dangerous phenomena via the 
secondary and tertiary critical events.17  
In this research, arranging the causes and consequences taxonomies according to the 
ARAMIS fault trees and event trees would have benefitted users who are using the 
incident knowledgebase for the purpose of scenario building. However, if the taxonomy 
is not structured in a hierarchy of categories, it will be complex and difficult for the 
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casual users to understand.  Hence, it would contradict the sole purpose of making the 
database more accessible. Therefore, to compromise, it is proposed to link some of the 
higher level categories (inner branches of the classification tree) in the main taxonomy to 
the ARAMIS fault trees for causes and event trees for consequences. 
2.3    Integration of Incident Database with Operational and Design Software 
Bond18 has proposed the linking of an incident database to the design and operational 
software and demonstrated the advantages of this linkage to design software, to Hazard 
and Operability Studies (HAZOP) software and to risk assessment forms. It is very 
important to identify the hazards at an early stage or during the design phase of a process 
plant, since any modifications done later would be more costly. Therefore, it is important 
for the design engineer to be aware of all the past incidents involving the substances and 
equipment of the process to be designed. So if a database is integrated to design 
software, which actively alerts the design engineer of relevant past incidents with lessons 
learned information, it provides an opportunity to analyze all the hazards and incorporate 
the lessons learned in the final design. In risk assessment for an individual task, the first 
step involves identification of all the hazards. This step requires experienced people and 
also frequent look up in the incident database in order to identify the incident scenarios 
relevant to the task at hand. In Risk Assessment the combination of the incident database 
with the software provides a useful and user friendly system for identifying and 
assessing the risks.  Process hazard analysis (PHA) is done before commissioning and 
also during operation (especially after a significant change has been made) of a process 
plant to identify the hazards that have been overlooked by designers and also those that 
exist for the unsuspecting operators.  One of the common techniques used for PHA is 
HAZOP1, which is a structured and comprehensive process of identifying hazards and 
requires a multidisciplinary team including experienced and knowledgeable individuals, 
process safety information (PSI) and past incidents. Therefore, integrating incident 
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database to HAZOP software would reduce time involved in the HAZOP procedure and 
could also make the software more user friendly in identifying hazards. 
Trevor Kletz19 has proposed linkage of incident database to design and operational 
software similar to Microsoft Word© spell check program. The database can run on the 
background of software and whenever certain keywords appear in the software interface, 
it is highlighted and the user can look into the incident information relevant to the 
keyword with the click of a button. The inspiration for this research came from Kletz’s 
proposal and the second objective is dedicated to implementing this idea. Further 
motivation came from Bond’s proposal and sheer explanation of the benefits. 
Chung2 has developed a standalone database based on fuzzy search and proposed 
integration of the database to computer tools used by plant designers, operators, and 
maintenance engineers, such as CAD and digital control systems. The two different 
types of data retrieval as referred to by Chung are manual and automatic. Plant designers 
are expected to use manual data retrieval at initial stage of design while automatic 
database systems will help them during the detailed design phase to identify and avoid 
past incidents. The automatic retrieval for designers is suggested by integrating database 
with flow sheeting or CAD systems. HAZOP teams are expected to make use of the 
manual system in order to identify potential hazards and operability problems that have 
not been effectively addressed in the design stage. While plant operators and 
maintenance personnel are expected to make use of only the automatic system, since 
they are less likely to browse through incident databases in their day to day jobs. For the 
benefit of the operators, the database could be linked to a digital control system, so that  
they could be further informed about a hazardous situation before an alarm goes off, 
which will give them the opportunity to react appropriately instead of just cancelling the 
alarm. For maintenance personnel, integrating database to a computerized permit-to-
work system would provide them with the opportunity to identify hazards with the 
maintenance task at hand. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1    Taxonomy Development 
The incident taxonomy development method has been divided into three sections, as 
highlighted in Figure 3. Literature review of other incident classification and text mining 
of past incident information have been carried out to build an initial taxonomy. The 
taxonomy is then sent to five individuals, experts in the field of chemical process safety 
in order to identify inconsistencies in the taxonomy. The suggestions gathered from the 
experts were analyzed and changes made accordingly to develop the final taxonomy. 
 
 
Figure 3. Applied methodology for incident taxonomy development 
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3.2    Database Search System 
Once prepared, the taxonomy has been implemented as Microsoft Excel worksheets, 
where each node of the taxonomy tree is a folder. The taxonomy is then populated with 
the incident information from the MARS database short reports, classifying each 
incident in different folders according to their relevancy. This method is applied to 
create a database system, which has the option of guided search for the users by means 
of folder searching. The computer coding done to implement the taxonomy to a database 
system and to build an interface for the users to retrieve incident was developed using 
JAVA. 
Besides folder search, the users are provided with the option of word search to retrieve 
incident information. Folder searching along with word searching will help narrow down 
the users’ scope of search and direct them to more relevant results of their queries. A 
third approach is to render the database active through integration with a Management of 
Change software prototype.  
The techniques applied for text mining past incident data is explained in detail in 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Section 5.1 provides details of the sources used to build the 
taxonomy. The method of building the search system is explained in Section 6.1, 6.2, 
and 6.3. Finally, methodology applied for integration of the MOC software prototype 
with the incident database is described in detail in Section 7.  
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4. TEXT MINING OF PAST INCIDENT DATA 
Text mining is the process of deriving meaningful patterns, trends, and hypothesis from 
a collection of texts, that are not explicitly revealed in the text sources.20 Text mining of 
past incident information has been performed for the purpose of finding unique words 
that represent the incident descriptions and also to reveal relationships between different 
keywords. Text mining is applied in the hope of finding related keywords that would aid 
in the taxonomy development process. The flow diagram for the text mining method is 
shown in Figure 4 and it is explained further in the rest of this section. 
4.1    Data Preparation 
Past data chosen for text mining is the MARS database, which have short incident 
reports. This database is particularly chosen for its numerous text fields, which can help 
in understanding not only trends but details of causes and lessons learned for each 
incident. A JAVA program has been coded to capture the MARS short reports available 
online from their website10 and convert the HTML data into an Excel file format. A list 
of the variables captured is shown in Table 1. Some of the categorical variables in the 
MARS database have subcategories, which have not been absorbed in the dataset to 
avoid coding a complex JAVA program that ‘crawls’ or scans the MARS database to 
retrieve information. For example, the variables Release, Fire, and Explosion have 
subcategories of major occurrences (solid release to air, flash fire, BLEVE, etc.) and 
initiating events that fall under these categories. All of these variables have been listed as 
binary categorical variables for simplicity. The categorical variables describing the type 
of hazardous substances involved (toxic, very toxic, extremely flammable, oxidizing, 
etc.) have also been simplified from the original data. MARS database has a list of the 
type of substances classified according to the Dangerous Substances Directive and other 
European Union laws concerning chemical safety.21 To keep it simple, categories such 
as toxic substance and very toxic substance has been classified as one and represents the 
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binary variable Toxic. Other simplifications also involves avoiding subcategories of 
variables, such as remedial measure (includes subcategories decontamination, 
restoration, other) and lessons learned theme, which have been recorded as binary 
variables. 
 
Figure 4. Flow diagram showing the Text Mining process of past incident data (Adapted from Raja & 
Tretter)22  
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Table 1. List of Variables from MARS Short Reports 
 
 
4.2    Text Mining Method 
Statsoft® Statistica software is used to perform the text mining applications. Statistica 
text mining algorithm process unstructured text data and convert unique words to 
meaningful numeric indices in order to make the information contained in the text 
Variable Name Type Description
Start Date Text Starting date of incident
Start Time Text Starting time of incident
Finish Date Text Finishing date of incident
Finish Time Text Finishing time of incident
Accident Title Text Title of the accident description 
Accident Type Categorica l Major accident, near miss , or other event as  defined
Reported under Categorica l Reported under Seveso I  or I I  di rective or other legis lative requirement
Seveso II  s tatus Categorica l What s tatus  of Seveso II  di rective i t fa l l s  under
Industria l  Activi ty Categorica l Type of industry/industria l  activi ty
Accident Description Text A brief description of the incident
Release Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f the incident involved release of a  substance; 0 otherwise
Fire Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f the incident involved fi re; 0 otherwise
Explos ion Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f there was  an explos ion; 0 otherwise
Si te Description Text Description of the s i te
Installation/Unit Description Text Description of the installation, unit, or equipment involved
Storage Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f the unit type was  s torage; 0 otherwise
Transfer Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f type of unit or operation is  tranfer; 0 otherwise
Transport Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f type of unit or operation is  transport; 0 otherwise
Process Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f type of unit or operation is  process ; 0 otherwise
Other Equipment Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f uni t/operation does  not fa l l  on last four categories ; 0 otherwise
Substances Involved Text List and a brief description of hazardous substances involved
Toxic Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f toxic substance is  involved; 0 otherwise
Flammable Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f flammable substance is  involved; 0 otherwise
Explos ive Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f explos ive substance is  involved; 0 otherwise
Oxidizing Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f oxidizing substance is  involved; 0 otherwise
Dangerous  for Environment Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f the substance is  ecotoxic; 0 otherwise
Causes of the accident Text A brief description of causes of the incident
Organizational Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f cause of incident i s  related to organizational  i s sues ; 0 otherwise
Plant/Equipment Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f cause of incident i s  due to equipment or technica l  fa i lure; 0 otherwise
Human Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f cause i s  human error; 0 otherwise
External Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f cause i s  due to external  events  (eg. bad weather); 0 otherwise
Other Cause Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f cause does  not fa l l  on any of the last four categories ; 0 otherwise
Consequences Text A brief description of the consequences
Human Consequences Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f fata l i ties , injuries , or other human consequences ; 0 otherwise
Disruption Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f dis ruption of publ ic activi ties , evacuation etc.; 0 otherwise
Environmental Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f incident resulted in pol lution and environmental  damage; 0 otherwise
Emergency Response Text A brief description of the emergency response
Remedia l  measure Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f remedia l  measure has  been taken; 0 otherwise
Lessons  learned theme Categorica l  (binary) 1 i f theme of lessons  learned is  identi fied; 0 otherwise
Lessons Learned Text A brief description of the lessons learned
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available to different data mining algorithm.23 Before the numeric index can be 
developed to give meaningful results, several pre-processing steps need to be done in 
order to prepare the data. 
4.2.1    Pre-processing Steps before Indexing 
Various pre-processing steps performed before the text is converted to numbers are 
described below: 
Stop words 
Before the index is built, Statistica text miner allows the option to choose stop words, 
which are words that would be excluded from the index. Statistica has an in-built 
English stop words list, which includes words such as prepositions that tend to exist in 
all documents and do not aid in characterizing individual document. Besides the in-built 
stop words, there is the option to add more unimportant words to the list.  
Start words 
Just opposite to stop words, start words are used to make sure the important words are 
included for indexing. 
Phrases & Synonyms 
Besides stop and start words, one can input a specific phrase to be indexed as a single 
term. For example, the term ‘source’ can mean source of a release and at the same time it 
can exist in the term ‘ignition source’, which has a completely different meaning. 
Therefore adding the term ignition source in the phrase list allows the term to be 
considered separately for indexing. A list of declared synonyms counts two or more 
words with similar meaning only once for indexing. Sometimes when it is difficult to 
work with a long list of words, synonyms can be effectively used to reduce this list by 
declaring words with similar attributes as one.  
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Stemming 
Stemming is another important pre-processing step before indexing. Stemming reduces 
the words to their roots so that different grammatical forms or verb conjugations are 
identified and indexed as the same word. For example, call, calling, and called would all 
be considered one word after stemming. The stemming algorithm is language dependent; 
therefore the English stemming language has been used for this research. 
Besides these preprocessing steps, there are other features in Statistica text miner that 
help to refine the selection of words from the collection of documents (corpus). These 
are: 
 Excluding certain characters, numbers, or character sequences 
 Excluding words that are shorter or longer than a certain number of letters 
 Excluding rare words that occur in a small percentage of documents. 
4.2.2    Indexing 
Statistica indexer forms a matrix, which has the dimension of (total number of unique 
words) x (total number of documents). The words are selected after the preprocessing 
steps are performed and indexed according to their frequencies in a given document. 
This measure is called word frequency (wf) or term frequency (tf) for those terms that 
have been declared in the phrase list during preprocessing steps. Term frequency is the 
simplest and not the most effective measure to identify unique words. Thus the raw word 
frequency can be transformed to other measures. 
Transforming word frequencies 
Once the words are indexed, there are a number of ways to transform the raw word 
frequencies in order to summarize the extracted information. For this research the chosen 
transformation is inverse document frequency (idf).  idfi,j for word i and document j is 
defined by the following equation:20 
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Where N = no. of documents 
dfi = no. of documents where word i exist  
wfi,j = frequency of word i in document j 
 
dfi and wfi,j are also called document frequency and word frequency respective. The log 
function dampens the simple word frequencies and also includes a weighting factor that 
becomes zero if the word appears in all documents. Thus, this transformation is done to 
create indices that both reflect relative frequencies of words as well as their semantic 
significance over the documents.23 
4.2.3    Latent Semantic Indexing by Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) 
Singular value decomposition is an analytic tool for interpreting the meaning described 
by the extracted words through mapping the words or documents into a common space. 
Latent semantic indexing allows identification of underlying dimensions into which the 
words and documents can be mapped. That way the underlying or latent themes 
described in the incident reports can be identified.  
The purpose of SVD is to reduce the overall dimensionality of the (words) x 
(documents) matrix to a lower-dimensional space. Each of these dimensions represents 
the largest degree of variability between words or documents. Ideally two or three most 
significant dimensions can be chosen that account for most of the variability. Statistica 
SVD is performed by the described process: 
If A represents an m x n matrix, where m is the number of documents and n is the 
number of words, SVD computes the m x r orthogonal matrix U, n x r orthogonal matrix 
 (1) 
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V, and r x r matrix D, so that A =UDV΄, and so that r is the number of eigenvalues of 
A΄A. 
An iterative method is used to compute SVD in order to reduce dimensionality of the 
large and sparse matrix A. This method produces accurate values for the large singular 
values but less so for the smaller singular values. Hence a ‘scree’ plot is produced to 
display relative sizes of the singular values and the values that are left of the elbow of 
the scree plot represents most of the variability and are retained for analysis. Scree plots 
for the MARS data can be found in Section 3.3. The word coefficients calculated by the 
program are computed as the matrix W, where AW = U and matrix U is the document 
score matrix.23 
One application of SVD is to find the word importance, which shows the relative sizes 
of the square root of the diagonal values in VDU΄UDV΄ = VDDV΄. These indices can be 
interpreted as the extent to which individual words are represented by singular values 
and hence how important the words are for defining the latent space.23 
4.2.4    Selecting Predictor Words with Feature Selection and Variable Screening 
Feature selection and Variable Screening module (FSL module) in Statistica text miner 
allows selecting predictor words from a large list of indexed words. This is ideal for 
classification problems, where selection of a subset of predictors from a large list of 
candidates is necessary. Therefore, this tool can serve to select manageable number of 
predictors that are likely to be related to the dependent variables of interest.  
The words converted to numeric indexes can be represented as continuous variables, 
where the variable is dependent on each document in the (term) x (document) matrix. 
Using FSL module then the predictor terms can be narrowed down for a given term. The 
FSL module computes the ratio of the variance between a given term (dependent 
variable) and predictor variable to variance within the dependent variable. It divides the 
range of values in each predictor into k intervals, where k is 10 by default to adjust the 
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algorithm sensitivity to linear or non-linear relationships.23 The user defined number of 
best predictors can be sorted using either the F or p value as criterion of predictor 
importance. For categorical dependent variables, the criteria for selecting best predictors 
are Chi-square and p values. 
4.2.5    k-means Clustering 
Once the Singular Value Decomposition is performed to reduce dimensionality of the 
input matrix, the top components can be used to analyze the data using different data 
mining techniques. One such technique is cluster analysis, whereby the incidents can be 
classified into similar clusters, based on word counts and relationship between words.  
k-means clustering is a clustering technique where given a fixed number of clusters, the 
algorithm assigns observations to those clusters, whose means are as different from each 
other as possible.20 The difference between the observations is evaluated with any one of 
several distance measures. For this research the simple Euclidean distance measure has 
been chosen.  
4.3    Text Mining Results and Discussion 
The text variables accident title, accident description, installation/unit description, 
substances involved, causes of the accident, consequences, emergency response, and 
lessons learned have been used for text mining. A list of stop words has been developed 
to eliminate all the unwanted words. A list of important phrases has been developed to 
include the common terms for this corpus of documents, such as ‘boiling liquid 
expanding vapor explosion’ or ‘toxic cloud’. Also a list of synonyms has been built, 
which includes not only synonyms but also words with similar connotations, such as 
people, population, and residents (which most likely in the report, relates to the 
casualties or vulnerable population outside the fence) were all identified as one word 
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people. All three lists were changed iteratively until a smaller group of words were 
chosen for indexing. Out of this group a start word list is developed by hand picking 
those words that contain more meaning in relation to the context of incident reports. 
These four lists, as shown in Appendix A, were finally incorporated to obtain a 
representative group of words for indexing. The total number of words indexed was 332 
(reduced from around 1000 words) from a total of 696 incident reports.  
The word frequencies for the indexed words were converted to inverse document 
frequency before running the SVD module of Statistica. The number of components 
obtained was 22 as shown in Figure 5. The top four components left of the elbow of the 
scree plot, are the salient ones that account for 31% of the variability between the words 
and the documents.  
Figures 6 and 7 show the plots of component 1 against component 2 and component 1 
against component 3 respectively, representing words in semantic space. The outliers in 
these plots are the significant or important words in the corpus of incident reports and 
the words appearing closer to one another are related to one another.23 
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Figure 5. Scree plot 
 
Figure 6. Words in semantic space: SVD component 1 vs. component 2 
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Figure 7. Words in semantic space: SVD component 1 vs. component 3 
From Figure 6 it can be seen that the words tank, valve, level, gasket, phenol, function, 
maintain, control, pump, automatic, manual, flange, catchment, phenolproof, and fill are 
the outliers, which may indicate some of the reports include incidents where due to 
automatic or manual valve failure or pump failure the tank overfilled. It can also indicate 
events such as, due to inadequate maintenance, the pump flange or control failed leading 
to overfilling. Reviewing the incident database shows that there exist specific incident of 
phenol leak from pump due to inappropriate flange installation, that is not phenol-proof 
and thus reacted with the phenol. The phenol was collected in a catchment pit. The term 
maintenance has been listed as synonyms of maintain and maintaining, thus the word 
maintain suggest maintenance actions. 
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Figure 7 manifests existence of incidents related to refinery and petrochemicals. The 
group of words (circled in Figure 7) on the upper left corner indicates the ingredients of 
a toxic cloud. Fire in a fertilizer storage area can initiate decomposition of ammonium 
nitrate and result in release of toxic substances such as nitrogen oxide, ammonia, and 
nitric acid to form toxic vapor cloud. 
 
Figure 8. Words in semantic space: SVD component 2 vs. component 4 
Another significant set of words is found in the plot of component 2 against component 
4, as shown in Figure 8. These words may indicate incidents related to blast furnace, gas 
container failure and resulting fire, or gas container failure resulting in nearby natural 
gas installation destruction and fire etc. 
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The words of interest were further drilled down using the ‘feature selection’ tool in 
Statistica, as shown in Figures 9-15. The importance plots were obtained for different 
words and also some binary variables. The significance of these plots is that the 
predictor words are likely to occur at the same document, where the dependent variables 
(word or binary variable) occur. Figures 9 and 10 show the importance plots for gasket 
and tank, the significant words that we saw common in the semantic space plots (Figures 
6, 7, and 8). From these plots, the basic ideas that can be deduced is that tank failure can 
result from pump or valve failure with resulting event of overfilling and release. Bund or 
catchment pits can act as passive mitigation system to control or hold the released 
material. Automatic or manual valve failure and pump failure causes can be related to 
inadequate maintenance with specific reasons such as phenol reacting with gasket and 
causing leakage. Tank incidents can also be related to empty tanks or fast emptying of 
tanks causing a vacuum. 
 
Figure 9. Importance plot for the word ‘gasket’ 
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Figure 10. Importance plot for the word ‘tank’ 
 
 
Figure 11. Importance plot for the word ‘refinery’ 
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Figure 11 shows the top 15 descriptive words for incidents in ‘refinery’ (word chosen 
from the outliers of Figure 8).  
Hazardous materials, conditions, consequences, and mitigation measures of a possible 
toxic cloud formation incident can be identified from Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 12. Importance plot for the word ‘cloud’ 
Figure 13 shows the keywords for possible conditions leading to overpressure and 
following consequences. 
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Figure 13. Importance plot for the word ‘overpressure’ 
Various importance plots similar to Figures 9-13 have been obtained to analyze the 
information contained in the MARS data in order to find some informative relations for 
taxonomy building purposes. It should be noted that importance plot with binary variable 
as the dependent variable, sometimes provided a different result compared to that for a 
word variable. For example, the importance plots for the word ‘release’ and the binary 
variable ‘release’, as shown in Figures 14 and 15, are a little different. Release events 
usually result in a cloud formation, which may later result in an explosion; noticeably, 
both the terms, explosion and cloud are present in Figure 14. However, none of these 
words exist in the top 15 important descriptor words for the word ‘release’, although the 
term, atmosphere may imply flammable atmosphere. This shows that in a release event, 
which resulted in cloud formation or explosion, the word release is likely not used. This 
is one of the limitations of using only text variables for analysis. 
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Figure 14. Importance plot for the binary categorical variable ‘Release’ 
 
Figure 15. Importance plot for the word ‘release’ 
Next, k-means clustering application has been applied to the SVDs for further analyzing 
the words and finding groups of words that are related and that make natural clusters. 
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Initially the total number of clusters chosen was 5 and went up to 12 clusters until some 
meaningful word clusters were obtained. The optimum number was 7 clusters. 
Table 2. Clusters of All Text Variables with Representative Terms 
Cluster Percent Representative Terms 
1 45% 
boiler, oxygen, solvent, ethylene oxide, methanol, catalyst,                  
flammable liquid, hydrocarbon, burst, carbon dioxide, shock wave,      
sprinkler, runaway reaction, toluene, fire water, relief valve, flash fire, 
water curtain 
2 8% 
explosion, compressor, pipeline, powder, mix, air, roof, tower, shell, 
empty, dust, chamber, atmosphere, ignite, benzene, flame, electric, 
repair, wall 
3 10% 
reactor, gasket, tank, pipe, vessel, lpg, phenol, valve, line, leak, liquid, 
level, overpressure, temperature, high,  phenolproof, fire-fighter, 
catchment, pump, full, water, release, alarm, maintain, control 
4 20% 
waste, bund, crude, drain, smoke, tanker, basin, sewage, relief, vent, 
road, isolate, hospital, health, environment, shut, rain, river, spill, rate, 
shutdown, people, exposed, clean, overflow 
5 < 1% ammonia 
6 14% 
natural gas, refinery, foam, oil, naphtha, seal, corrosion, gasoline, 
column, methane, fuel, propane, flare, sulphur, gas cloud, vapour cloud 
explosion, butane, design, rupture, collapse, petrochemical, extinguish, 
diesel, heat 
7 2% 
chlorine, furnace, blast, decomposition, nitrogen, nitric acid, 
ammonium nitrate, iron 
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the representative terms in each cluster and the 
percentage of each cluster segment among the total number of words. It should be noted 
that the representative terms are not a complete list of term members for individual 
cluster. A detailed table of results for each cluster with all member terms can be found in 
Appendix B. Table 3 provides a summary of the cluster names or labels that are assigned 
to the clusters after examining the significant keywords in each distinct cluster. Since 
this analysis includes data from all applicable text variables in the MARS database, it is 
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presumed that the cluster classification would incline more toward broad categories of 
incident types. 
Table 3. Cluster Labels of All Text Variables 
Cluster Percent Cluster label 
1 45% Flammable gas fire scenario and some toxic release 
2 8% Explosion (chemical & physical) 
3 10% Flammable liquid release with resulting fire 
4 20% Environmental/off-site consequences due to toxic release 
5 < 1% Ammonia incidents 
6 14% Flammable gas/vapor explosion 
7 2% Decomposition and runaway reaction 
 
Cluster 1 includes mostly terms that relate to flammable gas fire, although there are 
some terms, such as sulphuric acid, waste water, hydrogen fluoride, hydrogen chloride, 
sodium hypochlorite, and hydrochloric acid that are toxic substances, which may 
indicate these substances were released due to fire as domino effect. Or these terms may 
simply relate to toxic substance release. Similarly, other clusters also contain a few 
outliers that do not exactly belong to the rest of the cluster members and thus, the classes 
defined in Table 3. This implies that the clusters are not clearly differentiated from one 
another. This limitation is partly due to the large number of words, which can be further 
reduced by declaring words with similar connotations as one; it is also perhaps a result 
of using all text variables instead of focusing on a particular one at a time, such as 
causes or consequences etc. The former is a tedious, repetitive process that requires 
domain knowledge as well as a clear knowledge of the dataset. Since the iterative 
process had to be stopped at one point, the pre-processing stage was discontinued after 
obtaining 332 terms, which is small compared to 1000 terms but not small enough to 
provide distinct, manageable clusters.  
In order to obtain more meaningful result, similar text mining analysis has been applied 
for only the causes of the accident text variable. Total number of unique words obtained 
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was 131 and total number of SVDs was 27, among which first four are the most 
significant. Figure 16 shows the words in semantic space for this study. Here similar 
terms such as tank, valve, and gasket are the outliers as in Figure 6, with the addition of 
some causal terms such as degrade, inspect, maintenance, control, and procedure.  
 
Figure 16. SVD Component 1 vs. Component 2 for Causes Variable 
Clustering analysis has been further applied to the causes data and the results of seven 
clusters are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
 
e liquid 
release 
valve tank 
disconnect 
control 
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Table 4. Clusters of ‘Causes’ Variable with Representative Terms 
Cluster Percent Representative Terms 
1 5% air, electric, fire, open, safety, system 
2 4% alarm, high, pressure, supply, temperature 
3 8% analysis, corrosion, design, initiating event, inspect, internal, 
maintenance, material, metal, pipeline 
4 6% cloud, explosive, flammable, gas, mix, release, tank, vessel 
5 8% 
backflow, control, cool, gasket, hydrogen, process, reaction, valve, 
water 
6 15% 
clear, deficient, disconnect, drain, equipped, hazard, hose, instruct, 
leak, mechanic, operate, organizational, procedure, pump, repair, risk 
shift, train, work 
7 55% 
atmosphere, block, burst, change, chemical reaction, combusted, 
concentrated, decomposition, exothermic reaction, dust, expansion, 
external, friction, high pressure, high temperature, hot, impact, 
isolate, overfill, overflow, overheated, overpressure, oxygen, runaway 
reaction, toxic, motor, shaft, seal, rupture, uncontrolled, tube, 
instrument, hydraulic 
 
Table 5. Causes Cluster Description 
Cluster Percent Cluster description 
1 5% 
Electrical equipment, overpressurization of air reservoir and safety 
system failure causing fire 
2 4% Alarm failure or lack of operator intervention on alarm resulting in 
temperature and pressure rise 
3 8% 
Inadequate maintenance, design, or inspection causing equipment 
failure 
4 6% 
Accidental mixing, tank/vessel failure causes release of flammable 
gas  
5 8% Control system failure and reactive hazard 
6 15% Organizational causes and human error 
7 55% 
Combination of process upset, chemical causes, and equipment 
failure 
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Cluster 7 is the largest and consists of terms that relate to a combination of broad 
categories, process upset, chemical causes, and equipment failure. Clusters 1, 2, and 4 
relate to very specific causes. Thus, cluster analysis on a specific variable can narrow 
down the study scope further to look into the detail of different areas of incident 
descriptions. 
Though text mining of past incidents can provide promising results, further modification 
needs to be done on the pre-processing steps to have a cleaner data in order to obtain 
significant results. In addition text mining is a tool, which can only be applied 
efficiently, having comprehensive domain knowledge to guide the study. Therefore at 
this point we need to divert attention toward taxonomy development with knowledge 
from literature and using text mining results, wherever applicable. 
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5. TAXONOMY DEVELOPMENT 
There are many reasons and objectives for the development of incident databases and the 
associated incident taxonomy. Depending on what the ultimate goal is, or what purpose 
it would serve, one or many different approaches can be chosen. Keeping the goal in 
mind - render incident databases more accessible to the users and thus more user-
friendly, a potential taxonomy has been proposed in this research. 
5.1    Initial Taxonomy Preparation  
Initially the taxonomy has been prepared from literature review of other taxonomies 
related to process safety. The collection of literature used is described in Section 2.2. 
The initial taxonomy has been divided into six parts namely, chemicals, equipment, 
operation, causes, consequences, and barriers in order to represent the bow-tie as shown 
in Figure 2 in Section 2.2. The idea behind this division was that besides helping users to 
find information of interest from any of these categories, it would also serve as a 
potential guide to scenario building. This may be helpful for users during Process 
Hazard Analysis (PHA) studies, where the first step is identification of potential hazards. 
5.2    Expert Suggestions and Modifications 
Some experts have provided detailed suggestions for change, while others have 
suggested minor changes, such as addition of another node on top of the existing 
taxonomy. It has been observed that different ideas are offered by different reviewers 
depending on individual interest and contemplated goals of this research. This 
observation supports the philosophy that there is no ‘the way’ of preparing incident 
taxonomy. Two of the major interests of reviewers and the related suggestions are 
described in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. 
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5.2.1    Taxonomy for Incident Scenario Building 
For the incident taxonomy to be useful for scenario building, the causes and 
consequences taxonomy has to follow a sequence of events. For instance, the causes 
taxonomy should follow more like the fault trees and the consequences taxonomy like 
the event trees of the ARAMIS project, as described in Section 2.2. This is because 
knowing what undesirable event can lead to what critical event via what possible routes 
is essential to determine the recipe of a potential disaster. Likewise knowledge of what 
critical event can lead to what dangerous phenomenon via what routes is necessary to 
determine the consequences. Hence, having the taxonomy arranged this way can aid the 
user to build a full picture of the incident scenario (ref. personal communication with 
H.J. Pasman). 
5.2.2    Incident Taxonomy for Incident Investigation 
Incident taxonomy could also be used as a guide in incident investigation. During an 
incident investigation, the list of keywords in the taxonomy, arranged in a hierarchy, can 
serve as a checklist for the investigators, who need to know what they should be looking 
for in order to establish causes or identify causation. One of the biggest problem of 
information retrieval is people sometimes do not know exactly what they want and even 
if they do, they may not know how to ask for it or use the same descriptors to ask for it. 
Therefore having a taxonomy provides an educated guess for the investigators. The main 
benefit is however, people will add keywords to their incident descriptions, which may 
help other people to pick and choose what keywords to use and find exactly what 
information they need (ref. personal communication with J. Chosnek). 
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5.3    Taxonomy Result for Incident Database Search System 
The initial taxonomy with some modifications from expert suggestions that led to a 
detailed taxonomy can be found in Appendix C. However, from aggregating expert 
comments, it has been observed that in order to have a taxonomy that serves the purpose 
of a more user friendly database, few important considerations have to be encompassed. 
These are: 
 The person in charge of inputting information in the database will not spend 
significant amount of time choosing the right keywords, if given a laundry list of 
choices. Therefore the choices need to be limited. 
 The more keywords that are available and used, the narrower the query result, 
however important information may be missing out from this result. On the other 
hand, if too few keywords are used, the number of hits is going to be too large 
and the user faces the challenge of fishing for relevant information from 
unrelated ones. 
 The provider of information as well as the seeker needs to have the same 
understanding of the meaning of each keyword. One way is to define each 
keyword. Fortunately, the benefit of having a hierarchical taxonomy is that, the 
inner keywords can serve as examples of the outer ones (inner refers to those that 
are deeper down the taxonomy branches). And a very narrow definition will be 
counterproductive, since this will require the need for numerous keywords to 
cover a broad category. Also, it is necessary to use RAGAGEP (Regularly and 
Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices) terms to avoid misconceptions.  
With these considerations, the detailed taxonomy in Appendix C has been further 
modified to reduce the number of keywords in order to meet the targeted purpose. The 
final, modified taxonomy can be found in Appendix D. Description of the six divisions, 
literature sources used and modifications are provided in Sections 5.3.1-5.3.6.  
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5.3.1    Chemicals Taxonomy 
Chemicals branch of the taxonomy would categorize incident descriptions according to 
the chemicals that are involved in the incident.  This branch has been classified into the 
state of the chemicals, type, hazard classification, and use. The hierarchy has mainly 
been gathered from Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Globally 
Harmonized System of classification and labeling of chemicals (GHS)13 and the Mary 
Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center’s unpublished research work on development of a 
general incident reporting taxonomy based on HSEES, NRC, EPA-RMP, OSHA, 
NIOSH (The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health), DOT NFIRS and 
IPIS database taxonomies.  
Modifications made to the initial chemicals taxonomy include conversion of the detailed 
hazard classification keywords to simpler terms. For example toxic substance health 
effects such as ‘Serious eye damage’ or ‘respiratory or skin effects’ has been eliminated 
and only the broader terms, acute toxicity and chronic toxicity, have been included. The 
modified taxonomy is shown in Appendix D, where the number of column corresponds 
to the number of level of the hierarchy. Hence, the first column is first level; the second 
column is second, etc. 
5.3.2    Equipment Taxonomy 
Equipment branch correspond to the equipment involved in the incident. It has been 
based on the taxonomies proposed by Chung and Jefferson11, Anand12, Markowski14, 
and MKOPSC unpublished research on incident reporting system taxonomy 
development. The initial modifications of this taxonomy was based on the concept of 
scenario building, thus the equipment were classified in a detailed hierarchy. However, 
modifications done later reduced the breadth of the taxonomy significantly and listed 
equipment that is commonly involved in incidents at the outer levels. As per the expert 
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suggestion, a sub category of ‘facilities’ was also added, which would contain 
information about the type of facility or installation. 
5.3.3    Operation Taxonomy 
Operation part of the taxonomy corresponds to the type of operations involved in the 
incident. This has been put together based on Chung and Jefferson11 and Markowski’s14 
taxonomy. Major change made on this taxonomy is eliminating some of the 
subcategories under ‘processing’, which defines the processing steps or phase when the 
incident happened, such as ‘heat transfer’, ‘separation’, etc. This is because it is 
redundant here, since most of these subcategories are already included in the equipment 
taxonomy.  
5.3.4    Causes Taxonomy 
Causes branch of the taxonomy represent the causes of the incidents. The initial 
taxonomy breaks down data into different categories up to level 3. From level 4 onward 
the causes have followed the general fault trees developed in the ARAMIS project.17 
Although the ARAMIS fault tree starts from critical event and leads backwards in the 
sequence of events, all the way to undesirable event, en route of necessary and sufficient 
causes, direct causes, and detailed direct causes, for simplicity the initial taxonomy 
included only the applicable causes and not all the details.  Besides the ARAMIS 
project, the information to build this taxonomy has been taken from Chung and 
Jefferson11 and Markowski14. 
The initial taxonomy was created partially based on the idea of scenario building as 
future application. Thus the modifications made on this taxonomy were to reduce the 
breadth of the taxonomy and keeping the format more categorical as opposed to 
sequential in order not to compromise the primary goal – improving user accessibility of 
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incident database. One of the valuable suggestions from the reviewers of this taxonomy 
was to include both root causes and initiating events or immediate causes in the causes 
taxonomy. For this reason, a subcategory of initiating causes has been added on top of 
the detailed causes subcategories. The detailed causes' subcategories in this case serve as 
the root causes. The initiating event mostly follows the categorization of CCPS-PSID. 
5.3.5    Consequences Taxonomy 
Consequences branch correspond to the consequences of the incident. For simplicity the 
first level of this taxonomy has both consequences of dangerous phenomenon, such as 
fire, explosion, etc. as well as consequences on people, plant/property/equipment, etc. It 
has been put together from Chung and Jefferson11, Markowski14, and ARAMIS project17. 
The explosions subcategory has been classified according to explosion classification of 
Abbasi et al.24 Again the modifications done to this taxonomy were to make it more 
structured in order to meet the goals of this research. The subcategory, ‘internal 
fire/explosion’ (fire or explosion in a confined space, such as tank or vessel) has been 
taken out from the initial taxonomy, since this subcategory is redundant, as this is 
already contained in the fire and explosion subcategory and may create confusion among 
the users.  
5.3.6    Barriers/Layers of Protection (LOP) Taxonomy 
Barriers branch correspond to the barriers that either eliminate or prevent a hazard from 
turning into a critical event, protect the facility by taking early action, and if the critical 
event has to happen, barriers help mitigate or reduce the consequences (as in barriers in 
bow-ties). The barrier taxonomy has been kept simple and categorized according to their 
type. Markowski’s14 taxonomy has been followed to build this structure. In addition, 
Sklet’s25 definition and classification of barriers has been studied to make a better 
informed decision of dividing the barriers into prevention, protection, and mitigation 
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barriers. A fourth subcategory, ‘avoidance’ have been suggested by the reviewers, which 
may include the inherently safe designs (differentiated from inherently safer design) that 
have been able to avoid or eliminate the hazard completely. However, this change has 
not been made, since ‘inherently safe design’ can be incorporated into the ‘prevention’ 
subcategory in order to follow the target of keeping the keywords to a minimum.  
Further changes done to the taxonomy includes modifying the broad category name 
‘barriers’ to Layers of Protection, since it is a more preferable RAGAGEP term. 
Questions has been raised regarding the usage of the LOP taxonomy, since it is highly 
unlikely for incident reports to contain information on whether an existing LOP 
prevented the incident from becoming a worse one. However, the experts agree that it is 
a good idea to have LOPs as a keyword, which may force the community to think about 
‘what went well’ besides ‘what went wrong’, when doing an incident investigation.  
5.3.7    Other Modifications 
Besides all the amendments to the initial taxonomy, a seventh part of the taxonomy has 
been added as per Dr. Trevor Kletz’s comments. The seventh taxonomy is ‘Actions and 
Recommendations’ to include the recommended changes or actions taken after the 
incident. This can improve ways of operation and design and prevent recurrence of the 
incident. In order to reduce the breadth of the taxonomy, a maximum of three levels has 
been suggested with the option of further levels that can contain examples. However, the 
modified taxonomy does contain some information at the fourth level, although in rare 
occasions, to maintain a coherent hierarchy.  
As a potential for future work of converting the database to an incident scenario building 
application, an example has been set by linking some nodes of the main taxonomy to 
that of the ARAMIS fault trees and event trees. This can lead the users to the other 
causes and the consequences related to a fault or event. For this research, only six such 
fault tree nodes have been linked to display potential of this linkage. The format of the 
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fault/event tree is still under consideration. An image embedded in an html page is used 
at this moment but this may not be feasible for really long fault trees. The method used 
for linking this data is explained in Section 6.3. 
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6. SEARCH SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
Some of the MARS incident database reports (html pages) have been manually classified 
in the modified taxonomy nodes to prepare for the folder search system. An information 
retrieval system was developed based on the populated taxonomy.  To make it easier for 
the end-users to retrieve information using word search as well as folder search option 
for their query, a user interface (UI) was designed. A third option is word search within a 
folder search, which can greatly reduce or narrow down the search results for a given 
query and at the same time provide more relevant results. Description on the design and 
development of the search system is provided further in Sections 6.1-6.3. 
6.1    Word Search 
The JAVA code used for word search can be found in Appendix E. The following is a 
list of the tasks performed to prepare the word search module: 
 All the MARS database pages were downloaded.  
 The HTML pages were parsed to retrieve the text information that is displayed 
on the page. Parsing is the process of breaking down text into tokens or words 
that can be used for indexing. The resulting content was saved as text files. 
 An index is generated using the Apache Lucene26 parser on these text files. 
 Lucene search functionalities are used on this index based on the user query to 
find the relevant results. 
6.2    Folder Search 
The JAVA code used for the folder search can be found in Appendix E. Here is a list of 
the tasks done to prepare the folder search module: 
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 The taxonomy was prepared as a Microsoft Excel sheet. 
 The Excel Workbook was parsed and converted into a string data (sequence of 
characters) which can be recognized and converted to a folder tree by the UI 
module. 
 The string is returned to the invoking function (UI module). 
The folders at level 3 inside the causes branch are clickable that pops up images of 
ARAMIS fault trees, relevant to the branch. As mentioned in Section 5.3.7, for this 
research only a total of six images of ARAMIS fault tree are linked to the causes branch.  
 
6.3    Word Search within a Folder 
The JAVA code used for the word search within a folder can be found in Appendix E. 
The word search functionality for this part is as used in Section 6.1. The function takes 
two parameters, one is the name of the folder that is currently selected, and the other is 
the search query. The word search functionality can narrow down result for a long list of 
data, when used within folders. 
The functioning of the search system is further depicted in Figure 17 and Appendix F 
contains screenshots of the running database application. 
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Figure 17. Flowchart depicting how the search system works 
 
 
 
UI 
Module 
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7. INCIDENT DATABASE – MOC SOFTWARE INTEGRATION 
The MOC software prototype used for this project is based on the one provided by Dr. 
Jack Chosnek of Knowledge One process safety management consulting firm. The MOC 
form is adapted from Garland27. The software is built using File Maker Pro. A simple 
flowchart of the method is shown in Figure 18. 
        
Figure 18. Flowchart depicting how the active database integrated with the MOC software would return 
result 
The development process is summarized below: 
 A short list of keywords has been prepared for a few related incidents from the 
MARS database. 
 This information was used for populating a database table (keywords table) 
 A prototype MOC application (MOC form) was created using FileMaker Pro 
10.0v1. 
 A FileMaker script was created to run on the MOC form. The script reads the 
description of change in the MOC interface and looks for matching keywords in 
the ‘keywords table’. If there is a hit, it displays the related incidents. 
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 The user can click on the incidents to open a pop up window containing the 
incident report. 
Figure 19 shows the screenshot of the database application on MOC. The script pauses 
once the first keyword is highlighted and gives the user an option to click on it to reveal 
a list of related incidents, shown as file numbers in the right bottom corner of the screen. 
A click on any of these links will generate a pop up window with the related incident 
information as shown in Figure 20. Then to re-run the script to catch the next keyword, 
the user can click on the continue button on the top right corner of Figure 19. 
The keywords used for the active system is limited to hazardous chemicals and 
equipment list. Whenever a single keyword match is found with the incident files in the 
database, the system returns the first ten results. This can be enhanced, for example by 
using two or multiple keywords match, which may ensure better results are ranked on 
the top and thus fall under the top ten results that are displayed in the MOC screen. A 
fuzzy search criterion can also be employed to have better set of results. 
 
 
 
5
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Figure 19. Screenshot of MOC form in the program prototype
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Figure 20. Screenshot of the pop up window when one of the incident file links is clicked
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this research text mining techniques on MARS database and domain knowledge of 
process safety has been utilized to develop an incident taxonomy. The taxonomy was 
developed to serve as the hierarchy for an incident folder search system. Searching 
incident information using folder search as well as word search can greatly narrow down 
search results relevant to user needs. In addition, the idea of an active search system has 
been explored through integration of database with an MOC software prototype. 
Incident databases contain unstructured data, which can provide useful information 
about root causes and lessons learned. Text mining is a useful tool for analyzing large set 
of unstructured data by converting the text to structured data, which can then be used for 
further statistical or data mining analysis. Text mining applications on MARS database 
provided some useful insight on relationship between different keywords, which are 
helpful for building an incident taxonomy. However, the basic structure of the taxonomy 
had to come from process safety domain knowledge through literature review. Indeed 
text mining is only a tool that need educated guidance from domain knowledge to return 
the desired results. There is however, additional room for improvement on the text 
mining results through: 
 Further manipulation of the stop word list, start word list, phrases, and synonyms 
list until the total number of words are reduced to a minimum, consisting of non-
redundant useful keywords; 
 Starting with an educated list of keywords that conforms to the domain (process 
safety); this initial list can then be reduced by pairing up the terms that have the 
same connotations. However, this is an iterative step and there needs to be a 
stopping point, which is easier if the desired results are achieved within a 
reasonable timeframe. 
 Narrowing down the data scope by choosing one type of data; for example using 
a single variable may return more results within a narrow scope, which is easier 
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to analyze. In text mining, a large number of smaller text data is preferable as 
opposed to a fewer number of large text data. This is because large data tend to 
contain numerous terms and hence no term can characterize individual data. 
The taxonomy prepared for this research is a ‘first pass’ of incident taxonomy dedicated 
for categorizing keywords, which can help users find incident information they need but 
do not know how to ask for. There is still room for improvement and modifications. 
However, care should be taken as to keeping the purpose and goal in mind. For incident 
database searching purpose, the taxonomy needs to be kept as simple as possible, so that 
both tasks of finding and inputting information are easy. Otherwise people will not be 
motivated to use such system. 
The database arranged in a taxonomy is implemented in Microsoft Excel format, 
although initial attempts were made to use an open source Content Management System 
(CMS) for the purpose. However the database system created for this research is 
expandable and can be transformed to a CMS in future. It is highly recommended to use 
a CMS to store the database, because of the ease of managing a large set of data. The 
folders created in a CMS are virtual folders, which can be linked with other folders by 
pointers. Thus, it provides more flexibility in updating new information and changing 
the structure of the taxonomy with the flow, according to changing user/administrator 
needs. Once a fully fledged incident database is developed, it is very important for 
keeping the valuable data secured. This can be done by giving administrative privilege to 
one or two persons responsible for updating the data. Also maintaining a single data 
reporting format is useful for interpreting the information required or conveyed by both 
parties – reporter and user. Finally, a web-based system with user login capabilities will 
enhance the usability of the database system and will ensure growth. 
The active search system as designed for this research uses keywords to find related 
incidents. At this point, a single keyword match with an incident file is returning that file 
as result, if it is among the top ten results. This can be enhanced, for example by using 
two or multiple keywords match, which may ensure better results are ranked on the top 
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and thus fall under the top ten results that are displayed in the MOC screen. In addition, 
a set of intelligent keywords based on knowledge of process safety can ensure better 
matches and thus better search results. 
An active and knowledge-based incident information retrieval system can enhance our 
learning from past mistakes and make us more vigilant to incident records before making 
an educated, safer decision. 
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APPENDIX A 
A list of the initial start word list used for text mining all text variables of MARS 
database short reports is shown below. 
Absorption Detector HCL Monitor Secure 
Addition Detonate Head Motor Sensor 
Air Develop Health Naphtha Separate 
Alarm Diesel heat Near Severe 
Alert Dilute High Nitrate Sewage 
Ambient Dimension History Nitric acid Shell 
Ammonia Dioxide Hit Nitrogen Shelter 
Ammonium Discharge Hole Noise Shift 
Atmosphere Disconnect Hose Off-site Ship 
Audit Dismantle Hospital Oil Shock 
Authorised Disperse Hot On-site Shut 
Automatic Disrupted House 
Onsite emergency 
plan Shutdown 
Barrier Distance Human Open Signal 
Basin Distilled hydraulic Operate Skin 
Batch Door Hydrocarbon Organs Smell 
Benzene 
Double 
containment Hydrochloric acid Outlet Smoke 
Blast Downstream Hydrogen chloride Overflow Sodium 
Block Drain Hypochlorite Overheated Soil 
Blown Drop Ignite Overpressure Solid 
Boiler Drum Ignition source Oxide Solution 
Bolt Dry Immediate Oxygen Solvent 
Bottom Dust Impact Permit to work Source 
Break Ecologic Increase Pesticide Spark 
Brigade Electric Inert Petrochemical Speed 
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Build Eliminate Initiating event Pharmaceutical Spill 
Bund Emerge Inject Phase Spontaneous 
Burn Emission Injury Phenol Spray 
Burst Employee Inlet Phenolproof Spread 
Butane Empty Inspect Pipe Sprinkler 
Cable Energy Install Pipeline Start 
Calculate Engine Instrument Pit Start-up 
Capacity Environment Insulated Plastic State 
Car Equip Integrity Plate Steam 
Carbon Escape Interrupt Plug Steel 
Carbon 
monoxide Ethylene Intervene Police Store 
Catalyst Euro intervention Pollute Structure 
Catchment Evacuate Intoxicated Polyethylene Submerged 
Chamber Evaporate Inventory Polymeric Substitute 
Change Exceed investigate Pool Suction 
Channel Excess Iron Populated Sulphur 
Charge Exhaust Irritant Powder 
Sulphuric 
acid 
Check Exotherm Isolate Power Supply 
Chemicals Expert Issue Precipitate Surface 
Chlorine Explosion Jet Pressure Suspension 
Circuit Exposed Kill Pressurised Switch 
Classification External Knowledge Prevent Synthesis 
Clean Extinguish Laboratory Procedure Tank 
Close Extract lack Produce Tanker 
Cloud Eye Land Prohibited Temperature 
Coat Face Layer Propagate Test 
Collapse Fail Leak Propane Thermal 
Column Far length Protect Threshold 
Combusts Fast lesson Pump Toluene 
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Compliance Faulty Level Purge Tower 
Component Fauna Life Railway Toxic 
Compound Feed Lift Rain Train 
Compressed Fill Line Range Transfer 
Compressor Filter Liquid Rate Transport 
Concentrate Fire brigade Live React Treatment 
Concrete Fire-brigade Load Reaction Truck 
Condense Fire-fighter Lost Reactor Tube 
Confine Fire water Low Recurrence Underground 
Connect Fish Lpg Recycle Unload 
Consequence Fix Machine Reduction Upstream 
Contamined Flame Main Refinery Use 
Content Flammable Maintain Refrigerant Vacuum 
Control 
Flammable 
liquid Maintenance Regulate Valve 
Cool Flange Malfunction Release Vapour 
Corrosion Flare Man Relief Vapour cloud 
Cost Flash Manager Remedial Vehicle 
Cover flexible Manual Remote Vent 
Crack Flora Manufacture Repair Ventilated 
Crude Flow Material Replace Vessel 
Curtain Fluid Maximum Rescue Violent 
Cut Flush Measure Residue Wall 
Cylinder Foam Mechanic Resin Warehouse 
Data Form Medical Respiratory Warn 
Death Fragment Melt Respond Waste 
Decomposition Fuel Metal Restart Water 
Decontaminate Full Methane Reveal 
Water 
curtain 
Defect Fume Methanol Risk Weather 
Deflagrant Function Methyl River Weld 
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Deform Furnace Miss Road Well 
Degraded Gas Mistake Roof Wind 
Density Gasket Mitigate Rupture Window 
Depot Gasoline Mix Safe Wrong 
Design Glass Mixer School 
 
Destroy Good Mixture Screw 
 Detect Ground Modify Seal 
 The following is a list of the stop words used for text mining all text variables in addition 
to the default English stoplist of Statistica. 
abate attached done may remarks 
able attempt drawn mean represent 
abnormal attend due meet request 
absence attention either mention requested 
access august effect mentioned respect 
accident authors enough metres result 
accidents avail ensure minute resulted 
accord Away establishmentaffected minutes resulting 
according based etc might second 
account basis even mm sent 
across became event moment seveso 
act beside eventual month should 
action besides every morning side 
actual brought extent much significant 
ad ca fact must since 
adjoins can february name situated 
administrative carry first necessary six 
adopt cas five night slight 
advice category found north soon 
advise caught four now south 
advised cause furthermore obtain special 
affect causes gave obtained specific 
affected caused general occur stay 
afterwards causing give occurred subject 
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agency centre given occurrence subsequent 
agent certain go onto subsequently 
ago characteristic going one summary 
aid characteristics got order suppose 
allow chemical happen ordered take 
allowed circumstance happened particular taken 
allowing cm hour particularly taking 
almost code however per team 
along company hrs period th 
already companies ii place therefore 
also comprise incide placed third 
although comprises incident places though 
among concern include possible three 
annex Concerned Included possibly Thus 
another concerning Including prefect tonne 
anymore consequent industrie prepare took 
apart consider industry Prepared total 
apparent Considerable initial prepares toward 
apparently Considered instead Present try 
appear considering interest Presented two 
applicable considers involv probable Type 
application consist Involve probably undertaken 
appointed consult Involved Provide various 
appropriate Correspond involving provided via 
approx corresponding just purpose way 
approximate could keep put wasn 
approximately course kept question week 
area criteria kind rd went 
around date last Reach west 
arrange day lead reached whereas 
arrival de led realise whether 
arrive decide left reason whilst 
arrived decided like Receive will 
article decision longer received Within 
ask declare kg Refer without 
aspect describe litre reference would 
assist described m2 regard year 
associated description m3 Relate yes 
assume despite make relates yet 
assure determine made relevant 
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assured didn manage remain 
 attache discuss managed remains 
  
Next is a list of the phrases used for all text variable text mining analysis. 
ammonium nitrate operating condition 
Back pressure operating temperature 
block valve operating pressure 
Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion permit to work 
boiling point Personal protective equipment 
carbon dioxide Personal protective gear 
carbon monoxide polymeric isocyanate 
cellulose nitrate polymeric resins 
check valve polymeric SO3 
Comity of competent authorities pressure wave 
Committee of competent authorities process hazard analysis 
control valve process safety 
distributed control system quantitative risk assessment 
double containment rail tank 
ethylene oxide railway tanker 
fire ball recycle gas 
fire fighter reduction reaction 
fire water relief valve 
flammable gas retention basins 
flammable liquid risk asessment 
Flammable mixture runaway reaction 
flammable vapour safety culture 
flash fire safety measure 
flash point sample point 
flexible hose set pressure 
float valve set temperature 
gas cloud shock wave 
hazard analysis sodium cyanide 
hazard identification sodium hypochlorite 
hydrochloric acid spontaneous ignition 
hydrogen chloride spontaneous decomposition 
hydrogen fluoride spontaneous polymerisation 
ignition source standard operating procedure 
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initiating event sulphuric acid 
management of change titanium dioxide 
melting point transfer tank 
methyl chloride trichloro (methyl) silane 
methyl hydroperoxide (MHP) waste water 
methyl pyridylketone water curtain 
natural gas work permit 
nitric acid vapour cloud 
nitrogen dioxide vapour cloud explosion 
onsite emergency plan 
 Finally, the declared synonyms for text analysis of all variables are listed below. 
difficult: difficulty 
dimension: diameter, length 
discover: discovered 
dismantle: disconnect 
disperse: spread, spreading, dispersed  
disrupted: disturbed 
distributed control system: DCS 
drain: drainage 
electric: electrical 
emission: emitted 
employee: operator, staff, worker, personnel, crew 
empty: emptied 
environment: environmental, flora, fauna, fish 
escape: escaped, escaping 
establish: established, establishment 
euro: euros 
evacuate: evacuation, evacuated 
evaluate: evaluated 
examine: examined 
excess: exceed 
experience: experienced, expert 
explosion: explode, exploded 
exposed: exposure 
extend: extension 
extinguish: extinguished, extinguishing 
facility: facilities 
fail: failure, failed 
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fall: fell 
feed: fed, feeding 
fill: filled, filling 
fire-fighter: firefighter, fire fighter, firemen, fire-fighting, fire fighting, fire-brigade, fire brigade 
follow: followed, following 
form: formed, forming 
full: fully 
gas: gases, gaseous 
good: better, great 
hazard: dangerous, danger, harm 
hcl: hydrochloric, acid, hydrogen, chloride 
heat: heated, heating, hot 
high: higher, height 
hold: held 
hospitalized: hospitalised 
house: home 
identify: identification, identified 
ignite: ignited 
immediate: immediately 
implement: implemented 
improve: improved 
inadequate: insufficient, lack 
increase: increased, rise 
indicate: indicating, indicated, indication 
inform: informed 
initiate: initiated, initiating 
injury: injured, injures, injuries 
inspect: inspected, inspector 
install: installed 
interrupt: interrupted 
intervene: intervention, interven, intervened 
inventory: inventories 
issue: problem 
knowledge: lesson, learn 
leak: leakage, leaked, leaking 
located: located 
loss: lost 
low: lower 
lpg: liquefied, petroleum, gas 
maintain: maintained, maintenance 
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man: men 
manager: supervisor, supervise 
manufacture: manufacturing 
maximum: max 
measure: measured 
methane: methan 
methylethylketon: MEK 
mistake: error, wrong 
mix: mixed, mixing, combined, mixture 
monitor: observe, observes, observed 
near: nearby, vicinity, proximity, adjacent, nearest 
need: needed 
neighbour: neighbourhood, neighboring 
normal: normally 
note: noted 
note: notice 
off-site: offsite 
on-site: on-sit, onsite 
open: opened 
operate: operated, operating 
originate: originated, originating 
overpressure: over-pressure, over pressure 
partially: partly 
pass: passed 
people: person, populated, public, human 
perform: performed, performing 
pipe: pipework 
plan: planned 
pollute: polluted, pollution 
ppm: parts per million 
precaution: precautionary 
prevent: prevented, eliminate, avoid, precaution 
previous: prior, previously 
process: processing 
produce: produced, production, producing 
program: programme 
prohibited: restrict 
protect: protected 
pump: pumped, pumping 
quality: qualities 
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quantity: quantities 
quick: rapid, quickly, rapidly 
recover: recovery, recovered 
recycle gas: ricycle gas 
reduce: reduced, reduction 
region: regional 
release: discharge, discharged, emission 
remove: removed, removal 
repair: repaired 
replace: replaced, substitute 
report: reported 
require: requires, required, requirement 
resident: residential, house 
residue: residual, accumulate, deposit 
respond: response 
return: returned 
review: reviewed 
run: running 
rupture: ruptured 
safe: safety 
sample point: sample points 
seal: sealed, sealing 
see: seen 
separate: separated, separation 
severe: serious, intense, violent 
show: shown, showed 
shutdown: shut-down, shut-off 
spill: spillage 
spontaneous decomposition: decomposed spontaneously 
spontaneous ignition: ignited spontaneously 
start: started, starting, begin, began 
stop: stopped 
store: storage, stored 
structure: structural 
supplier: suppler 
supply: supplies, supplied 
temporary: temporarily 
test: tested, testing 
tetrahydrofurane: THF 
time: times 
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ton: tonnes, tonne 
training: train 
transfer: transfers, transferred 
transport: transports, transported 
treatment: treat 
use: used, using 
vapour: vapor 
vapour cloud: gas cloud 
vent: venting 
warning: warn, warned 
waste: effluent 
work: worked, working, duty 
work permit: permit to work, permit-to-work 
 
A list of the start words chosen for text mining the causes variable data is shown below. 
Pre startup safety review Shear stress Secomposition 
Procedures Shift change Thermal  
Process upset Shipping Expansion 
Pump Short-circuit Weakening 
Rail Side reaction Thermite reaction 
Rain Slip Tool 
Reactive chemical Smoking Toxic 
Refractory Snow Training 
Release Solid Transportation 
Repair Soluble Tube 
Resistance Spark Uncontrolled 
Reverse flow Spontaneous combustion Underfilling 
Risk analysis Stabilizer Underpressure 
Road Static electricity Unstable 
Roll-over Steam Utility 
Runaway reaction Steel Valve 
Rupture Storage Vandalism 
Rust Storm Vapour 
Sabotage Stress Vapour cloud 
Safety equipment Cracking Vessel 
Safety management Tank Vibration 
Safety relief Temperature Violation 
Sampling Tensile War 
Seal Terrorism Water 
70 
 
 
Shaft Testing Wind 
 
Following is a list of the causes phrases: 
accidental mixing thermal decomposition operation 
air system thermal expansion organic peroxide 
air vector thermal weakening oxidizing substance 
arc welding thermite reaction oxygen enrichment 
auto ignition unstable solid permit to work 
back pressure vapour cloud release plane crash 
back flow flow rate power supply 
bursting disc fuel supply pre startup safety review 
chemical reaction gas flame welding process upset 
computer system hazard analysis reactive chemical 
contributing factor hazardous substance relief valve 
cooling tower hazardous substances reverse flow 
cost cutting hazardous material risk analysis 
domino effect high pressure roll over 
dust explosion high temperature runaway reaction 
earth movement hot missile safety equipment 
electric installation human factors safety management 
emergency shutdown hydrogen embitterment safety relief 
emergency shut-down incompatible reagent safety relief valve 
emergency shut down initiating event safety valve 
equipment failure Instrumentation failure shear stress 
exhaust gas Insulating plate shift change 
exothermic reaction lack of earthing side reaction 
external force: External stress lock out spontaneous combustion 
external overpressure low pressure static electricity 
fast emptying low temperature steel grade 
flexible coupling magnifying glass stress corrosion cracking 
flexible hose management of change 
 floating roof material of construction 
  
Following is a list of the causes synonyms: 
mix: mixed, mixing 
age: aged, aging 
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assemble: assembling, assembled 
autoignition: auto ignition 
backflow: back flow 
block: blocked, blocking 
catalyst: catalytic 
clean: cleaning, cleaned 
code: codes, standard, standards, rules, regulations 
combustible: combustibility, combustion, combusted 
communication: communicated, communicate, information flow 
compress: compressed, compression, compressing, compressive 
condensation: condense, condensed, condensing 
conductor: conductivity, conduct 
deficiency: lack, absence, insufficient, inadequate 
degradation: degrade, degraded, damage, damaged 
design: designing, designed 
detection: detector, detect 
disconnect: disconnected, connection failure 
documentation: document, documents 
drain: draining, drainage 
earthquake: earth movement 
electric: electrical, electric, installation 
ergonomic: ergonomics 
expansion: expand, expanded 
explosive: explosivity 
fragment: fragmented 
freeze: freezing 
frothing: froth 
implementation: implement, implemented, implementing 
impurities: impurity 
inspection: inspect, inspected 
instruction: instructed, instruct 
isolation: isolate 
labelling: label, labels, labelled 
leak: leaking, leaked, leaks 
lifting: lift, lifted 
lockout: lock, out, lock-out 
lubrication: lubricate, lubricated, lubricating 
manning: manned, man 
misalignment: not aligned 
mistake: incorrect, wrong, error 
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omission: omit, omitted 
open: opened, opening, opens 
operation: operate, operating, operator 
organizational: management 
overfilling: overfill, overfilled 
overflow: overflowing, overflowed 
overheating: overheat, overheated 
overload: overloaded, overloading 
planning: plan 
policy: policies 
polymerization: polymerize 
pump: pumping, pumped 
rail: railway, rail-way 
repair: fix 
resistance: resistant 
roll-over: rollover, roll over 
rupture: breach, ruptured, breached 
rust: rusting, rusted 
sampling: sample 
shipping: ship, shipped 
short-circuit: short circuit 
storage: store, storing, stored 
stress: force 
tank: tanks, storage tank 
tensile: tension 
terrorism: terrorist 
testing: test, tested 
toxic: poisonous, poison 
training: train, trained 
transportation: transport 
uncontrolled: uncontrollable 
underfilling: underfill, underfilled 
vibration: vibrate, vibrating, vibrated 
violation: violate, violated, violating 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B.1 Cluster Members and Distances for All Variables k-means Cluster Analysis 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
ethylene oxide 1 0.945 16 27 flammable gas fire 
with some toxic 
release 
sulphuric acid 1 0.603 168 368 
boiler 1 0.516 178 337 
oxide 1 0.508 31 44 
 oxygen 1 0.466 66 378 
 waste water 1 0.431 11 25 
 pharmaceutical 1 0.418 12 51 
 tube 1 0.391 91 135 
 solvent 1 0.390 14 14 
 feed 1 0.386 143 239 
 onsite emergency plan 1 0.384 7 14 
 exhaust 1 0.378 33 94 
 hydrogen fluoride 1 0.376 16 30 
 carbon monoxide 1 0.349 22 94 
 hydrogen chloride 1 0.333 24 79 
 polyethylene 1 0.331 18 29 
 methanol 1 0.324 17 51 
 carbon 1 0.320 9 13 
 double 1 0.317 9 20 
 catalyst 1 0.312 71 157 
 increase 1 0.311 17 24 
 sodium hypochlorite 1 0.297 22 89 
 thermal 1 0.289 18 28 
 start-up 1 0.283 51 72 
 flammable liquid 1 0.279 20 73 
 dry 1 0.276 22 39 
 burst 1 0.273 34 86 
 hydrocarbon 1 0.269 12 20 
 carbon dioxide 1 0.263 22 38 
 shock wave 1 0.262 17 41 
 weld 1 0.259 98 140 
 hydrochloric acid 1 0.259 25 57 
 channel 1 0.252 26 47 
 sprinkler 1 0.249 62 84 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
nitric 1 0.245 62 479 
 install 1 0.245 31 41 
 defect 1 0.242 89 148 
 instrument 1 0.241 130 257 
 cylinder 1 0.241 17 37 
 ammonium 1 0.240 47 179 
 runaway reaction 1 0.240 7 7 
 compressed 1 0.240 9 9 
 barrier 1 0.239 28 43 
 pesticide 1 0.238 22 51 
 layer 1 0.238 11 19 
 motor 1 0.236 25 110 
 employee 1 0.233 56 69 
 evacuate 1 0.225 49 95 
 jet 1 0.223 300 707 
 train 1 0.219 8 15 
 toluene 1 0.218 22 30 
 hole 1 0.217 59 143 
 hit 1 0.217 191 249 
 batch 1 0.217 33 58 
 control valve 1 0.216 15 20 
 remote 1 0.214 33 146 
 mixer 1 0.212 10 30 
 experience 1 0.211 40 45 
 weather 1 0.211 41 125 
 inadequate 1 0.209 33 49 
 suspension 1 0.207 28 32 
 glass 1 0.206 20 61 
 fire water 1 0.202 101 136 
 signal 1 0.202 26 33 
 impact 1 0.202 21 30 
 cool 1 0.198 18 28 
 plastic 1 0.197 12 16 
 knowledge 1 0.197 23 50 
 cover 1 0.197 9 13 
 dilute 1 0.197 11 16 
 load 1 0.195 21 33 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
relief valve 1 0.195 31 51 
 respiratory 1 0.193 53 151 
 burn 1 0.187 25 42 
 head 1 0.187 13 15 
 flash fire 1 0.187 27 50 
 medical 1 0.185 42 93 
 rescue 1 0.185 40 69 
 door 1 0.185 452 1414 
 monitor 1 0.185 60 94 
 hose 1 0.184 46 73 
 school 1 0.184 26 35 
 integrity 1 0.183 13 17 
 manufacture 1 0.183 141 266 
 drum 1 0.182 58 78 
 good 1 0.182 32 134 
 vacuum 1 0.181 9 81 
 audit 1 0.181 22 32 
 water curtain 1 0.179 31 38 
 energy 1 0.179 20 49 
 noise 1 0.179 41 54 
 suction 1 0.173 262 1021 
 spray 1 0.173 44 57 
 inert 1 0.172 258 474 
 bolt 1 0.168 38 56 
 resin 1 0.167 17 21 
 injury 1 0.165 44 85 
 methyl 1 0.162 7 10 
 block 1 0.161 23 82 
 disperse 1 0.161 18 34 
 ignition source 1 0.161 465 3318 
 cable 1 0.158 34 55 
 reduce 1 0.157 127 219 
 residue 1 0.157 16 22 
 death 1 0.155 22 35 
 detect 1 0.150 121 205 
 plug 1 0.147 29 80 
 
absorption 1 0.146 7 10 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
insulated 1 0.146 12 21 
 
 
mistake 1 0.145 7 8 
 boiling point 1 0.145 16 25 
 flammable gas 1 0.145 95 174 
 issue 1 0.145 21 25 
 drop 1 0.144 68 180 
 intoxicated 1 0.144 37 122 
 comity of competent 
authorities 
1 0.144 132 202 
 prohibited 1 0.144 111 260 
 investigate 1 0.143 35 220 
 inlet 1 0.143 37 72 
 replace 1 0.142 95 502 
 protect 1 0.142 26 95 
 hypochlorite 1 0.141 34 55 
 consequence 1 0.140 26 30 
 overheated 1 0.139 102 184 
 shock 1 0.136 119 511 
 fluid 1 0.136 31 45 
 crack 1 0.135 61 116 
 malfunction 1 0.134 74 127 
 smell 1 0.133 160 301 
 safety culture 1 0.130 111 113 
 fill 1 0.128 22 33 
 flexible 1 0.128 24 36 
 work permit 1 0.128 21 56 
 land 1 0.127 81 130 
 flash point 1 0.126 18 43 
 permit to work 1 0.125 24 39 
 committee of competent 
authorities 
 
1 0.123 21 47 
 spark 1 0.121 38 110 
 engine 1 0.118 15 57 
 live 1 0.118 9 11 
 break 1 0.118 125 196 
 flash 1 0.118 25 31 
 restart 1 0.112 124 153 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
fast 1 0.111 52 61 
 
permit 1 0.109 36 59 
 
separate 1 0.102 60 80 
 pressure wave 1 0.094 12 21 
 pressurised 1 0.090 77 79 
 
on-sit 2 0.674 70 74 
explosion (chemical & 
physical) 
explosion 2 0.655 24 33  
 compressor 2 0.500 25 33 
pipeline 2 0.455 27 31 
 powder 2 0.432 11 17 
 mix 2 0.409 9 10 
 air 2 0.389 9 12 
 underground 2 0.381 98 127 
 roof 2 0.381 15 23 
 tower 2 0.377 39 60 
 shell 2 0.373 13 18 
 bottom 2 0.354 24 73 
 empty 2 0.316 18 32 
 chamber 2 0.315 9 10 
 dust 2 0.311 18 27 
 pit 2 0.308 27 36 
 measure 2 0.303 28 51 
 metal 2 0.301 19 26 
 ground 2 0.297 35 43 
 atmosphere 2 0.292 114 288 
 ignite 2 0.276 214 649 
 benzene 2 0.271 83 94 
 flame 2 0.245 14 28 
 near 2 0.243 129 348 
 test 2 0.217 138 378 
 electric 2 0.189 7 8 
 repair 2 0.178 24 35 
 wall 2 0.099 64 84 
 
reactor 3 0.944 69 109 
flammable liquid 
release with resulting 
fire 
hcl 3 0.816 204 412 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
     
 tank 3 0.683 20 24 
 pipe 3 0.647 29 60 
 vessel 3 0.630 113 190 
 
steam 3 0.619 299 306 
 
lpg 3 0.611 407 785 
 phenol 3 0.596 52 72 
 react 3 0.560 58 92 
 line 3 0.553 59 75 
 valve 3 0.484 50 105 
 function 3 0.478 24 45 
 plan 3 0.476 24 73 
 leak 3 0.414 13 20 
 liquid 3 0.401 21 27 
 level 3 0.394 131 134 
 temperature 3 0.394 114 230 
 overpressure 3 0.386 14 46 
 phenolproof 3 0.380 21 33 
 fire-fighter 3 0.350 19 36 
 catchment 3 0.349 18 79 
 high 3 0.327 32 120 
 pump 3 0.318 98 144 
 water 3 0.317 14 16 
 full 3 0.307 25 102 
 manual 3 0.302 81 202 
 flange 3 0.289 23 29 
 release 3 0.282 316 585 
 alarm 3 0.273 168 472 
 automatic 3 0.261 81 222 
 emerge 3 0.248 17 26 
 maintain 3 0.212 117 183 
 control 3 0.182 42 80 
 
waste 4 0.660 25 41 
environmental/off-site 
consequences due to 
toxic release 
bund 4 0.650 8 9 
 crude 4 0.630 245 676 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency 
 
drain 4 0.623 30 88 
plate 4 0.555 27 110 
 smoke 4 0.546 93 123 
 tanker 4 0.544 19 21 
 shift 4 0.494 7 11 
 basin 4 0.457 14 24 
 sewage 4 0.447 126 173 
 
relief 4 0.445 16 37 
 
vent 4 0.436 86 306 
 road 4 0.422 80 112 
 isolate 4 0.405 156 572 
 manager 4 0.403 71 220 
 filter 4 0.387 15 59 
 cloud 4 0.384 161 317 
 toxic 4 0.375 61 81 
 sodium 4 0.373 26 66 
 hospital 4 0.368 17 34 
 health 4 0.368 116 177 
 environment 4 0.363 17 30 
 steel 4 0.362 26 53 
 contain 4 0.361 29 93 
 shut 4 0.357 53 127 
 compliance 4 0.347 11 16 
 rain 4 0.339 15 20 
 work 4 0.334 325 432 
 solution 4 0.333 104 158 
 hydraulic 4 0.330 8 10 
 threshold 4 0.325 27 85 
 compound 4 0.309 20 19 
 river 4 0.308 150 397 
 close 4 0.304 29 49 
 excess 4 0.297 19 39 
 spill 4 0.296 24 32 
 rate 4 0.296 39 69 
 flow 4 0.286 119 303 
 laboratory 4 0.283 84 416 
 loss 4 0.280 295 311 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
pool 4 0.279 22 25 
 resident 4 0.278 72 264 
 downstream 4 0.278 392 938 
 wind 4 0.268 33 66 
 upstream 4 0.267 13 28 
 source 4 0.265 24 33 
 outlet 4 0.265 69 105 
 maximum 4 0.259 8 11 
 
open 4 0.249 39 71 
 
inventory 4 0.249 21 33 
 prevent 4 0.249 13 35 
 check 4 0.243 7 9 
 mitigate 4 0.240 25 35 
 well 4 0.238 7 10 
 procedure 4 0.231 66 180 
 solid 4 0.230 74 160 
 detector 4 0.223 70 143 
 start 4 0.220 15 26 
 overflow 4 0.217 103 174 
 vapour 4 0.215 9 12 
 shutdown 4 0.208 15 29 
 range 4 0.205 35 93 
 people 4 0.188 34 38 
 exposed 4 0.186 29 66 
 clean 4 0.180 17 38 
 immediate 4 0.138 53 134 
 ambient 4 0.137 22 27 
 ammonia 5 0.000 15 30 ammonia incidents 
natural gas 6 1.006 120 189 
flammable gas/vapor 
explosion 
ethylene 6 0.871 33 46 
 
 
refinery 6 0.740 21 29 
 
 
foam 6 0.591 26 35 
 
 
oil 6 0.581 76 177 
naphtha 6 0.580 45 124 
seal 6 0.541 13 36 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
gasoline 6 0.505 64 164 
 column 6 0.488 33 59 
 methan 6 0.462 73 97 
 depot 6 0.437 14 16 
 fuel 6 0.408 21 35 
 propane 6 0.381 20 34 
 flare 6 0.374 16 29 
 sulphur 6 0.374 51 84 
 lift 6 0.361 52 78 
 gas cloud 6 0.329 46 127 
 
butane 6 0.323 68 108 
 
low 6 0.300 21 40 
 design 6 0.293 45 118 
 rupture 6 0.292 23 91 
 collapse 6 0.290 17 27 
 petrochemical 6 0.288 283 1972 
 external 6 0.283 38 109 
 extinguish 6 0.282 134 254 
 flammable 6 0.281 40 63 
 railway 6 0.275 27 42 
 off-site 6 0.271 30 41 
 escape 6 0.266 28 87 
 dioxide 6 0.258 22 82 
 heat 6 0.257 136 252 
 power 6 0.253 14 22 
 vapour cloud explosion 6 0.248 40 76 
 vapour cloud 6 0.247 28 73 
 police 6 0.237 25 33 
 history 6 0.226 32 54 
 recurrence 6 0.224 218 876 
 interven 6 0.223 51 71 
 diesel 6 0.212 25 50 
 initiating event 6 0.200 7 11 
 density 6 0.199 35 103 
 material 6 0.194 91 269 
 initiate 6 0.184 59 93 
 cost 6 0.181 62 203 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
life 6 0.157 16 42 
 
chlorine 7 1.149 369 1295 
decomposition 
/runaway reaction 
furnace 7 0.950 25 35 
 
 
blast 7 0.517 20 25 
 
 
decomposition 7 0.493 16 34 
 
 
nitrogen 7 0.484 102 133 
 
 
nitric acid 7 0.454 71 127 
 
 
ammonium nitrate 7 0.444 140 318 
 
  iron 7 0.352 8 11 
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Table B.2 Cluster Members and Distances for Causes Variable k-means Cluster Analysis 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
air 1 0.479226 45 70 electrical equipment failure, 
overpressurisation of air 
reservoir, and safety system 
failure causing fire 
electric 1 0.556505 20 36 
fire 1 0.912052 47 55 
open 1 0.472332 25 30 
 safety 1 0.568258 36 55 
 system 1 0.497075 10 14 
 alarm 2 0.565022 10 13 Alarm failure or lack of 
operator intervention on 
alarm resulting in 
temperature and pressure 
rise 
high 2 0.369362 7 10 
pressure 2 0.700422 10 12 
supply 2 0.429417 7 7 
 temperature 2 0.449345 21 26 
 analysis 3 0.468352 31 49 Inadequate maintenance, 
design, or inspection 
causing equipment failure corrosion 3 0.665832 22 25 
design 3 0.377722 12 15 
 initiating event 3 0.446503 9 11 
 inspect 3 0.428363 82 109 
 internal 3 0.336308 25 39 
 maintenance 3 0.510390 43 73 
 material 3 0.656419 8 24 
 metal 3 0.602394 27 63 
 pipeline 3 0.695816 25 31 
 cloud 4 0.679848 27 27 Accidental mixing, 
tank/vessel failure causes 
release of flammable gas explosive 4 0.879623 61 69 
flammable 4 0.417143 13 14 
 gas 4 0.905925 151 211 
 mix 4 0.440814 23 33 
 release 4 0.525305 19 23 
 tank 4 1.177462 69 99 
 vessel 4 0.701452 33 53 
 
backflow 5 0.357295 44 57 
control system failure & 
reactive hazard 
control 5 0.442715 7 12 
 cool 5 0.665771 17 20 
 emerging 5 0.755865 8 10 
 gasket 5 0.938920 7 12 
 hydrogen 5 0.878108 104 197 
 process 5 0.444535 16 24 
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Table B2 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
reaction 5 0.633555 9 10 
 valve 5 1.087085 10 12 
 water 5 1.095180 12 14 
 
clear 6 0.315940 108 219 
organizational causes and 
human error 
deficient 6 0.366718 40 50 
 disconnect 6 0.529872 56 67 
 drain 6 0.590498 7 7 
 equipped 6 0.387393 11 14 
 hazard 6 0.600484 15 55 
 hose 6 0.513843 94 182 
 instruct 6 0.333076 40 131 
 leak 6 0.661081 13 24 
 liquid 6 1.165229 39 52 
 mechanic 6 0.511906 13 16 
 operate 6 0.528353 9 11 
 organizational 6 0.342119 14 27 
 procedure 6 0.499175 27 37 
 pump 6 0.931242 54 60 
 repair 6 0.310390 7 18 
 risk 6 0.445464 38 69 
 shift 6 0.675865 8 9 
 train 6 0.598971 8 8 
 work 6 0.546844 64 68 
 
atmosphere 7 0.484537 63 74 
Combination of process 
upset, chemical causes, and 
equipment failure 
block 7 0.287456 11 16  
 burst 7 0.200372 8 9 
change 7 0.300843 34 42 
 chemical 
reaction 
7 0.226122 16 23 
 clean 7 0.300218 15 18 
 combusted 7 0.327691 47 62 
 concentrated 7 0.295030 51 93 
 contain 7 0.223550 12 13 
 crack 7 0.947955 88 111 
 decompositio
n 
7 1.078827 60 80 
 degrade 7 0.425580 15 21 
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Table B2 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
detect 7 0.269935 18 34 
 dust 7 0.387008 16 19 
 exhaust 7 0.425415 15 24 
 exothermic 7 0.360747 7 12 
 exothermic 
reaction 
7 0.222496 50 67 
 expansion 7 0.329331 77 107 
 external 7 0.440200 7 8 
 factor 7 0.241760 30 36 
 fast 7 0.238910 8 15 
 fatigue 7 0.362412 8 12 
 flange 7 0.510924 12 15 
 flexible 7 0.212530 12 14 
 friction 7 0.308855 13 21 
 furnace 7 1.103715 8 8 
 high pressure 7 0.351277 24 46 
 high 
temperature 
7 0.307766 11 27 
 hot 7 0.486756 9 13 
 human 7 0.351844 8 10 
 hydraulic 7 0.759638 86 144 
 identification 7 0.278008 84 99 
 impact 7 0.220695 93 113 
 instrument 7 0.201985 61 110 
 isolate 7 0.560800 49 76 
 joint 7 0.268130 102 132 
 low 7 0.181276 13 17 
 mistake 7 0.260251 20 22 
 motor 7 0.545168 25 32 
 organic 7 0.226285 11 16 
 overfill 7 0.427597 10 13 
 overflow 7 0.363119 47 54 
 overheated 7 0.276506 75 95 
 overpressure 7 0.262289 8 13 
 oxygen 7 0.494965 18 27 
 permit 7 0.238353 9 12 
 plate 7 0.795589 13 23 
 polymeric 7 0.383224 7 8 
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Table B2 (cont.) 
 
Terms Cluster 
Distance to 
centroid 
Documents Frequency Cluster Name 
power 7 0.158049 7 8 
 relief 7 0.265836 9 9 
 roof 7 0.380034 10 10 
 runaway 
reaction 
7 0.371113 17 29 
 rupture 7 0.390059 17 20 
 safety valve 7 0.266790 9 12 
 seal 7 0.554987 21 28 
 shaft 7 0.299936 16 29 
 short-circuit 7 0.259944 99 156 
 solid 7 0.256733 164 499 
 spark 7 0.162238 44 66 
 spontaneous 7 0.178206 13 13 
 steam 7 0.761780 7 16 
 steel 7 0.350964 8 11 
 stress 7 0.340351 22 37 
 substance 7 0.379015 13 25 
 test 7 0.270933 8 8 
 tower 7 0.432991 109 299 
 toxic 7 0.187937 24 34 
 tube 7 0.427555 44 77 
 uncontrolled 7 0.148797 102 198 
 vapour 7 0.655221 18 26 
 weld 7 0.487157 7 7 
 wind 7 0.209762 52 72 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C.1. Initial, detailed taxonomy developed from literature and text mining results. 
Chemicals Taxonomy 
State Gas 
  
 
Liquid 
  
 
Solid 
  
 
Two-phase  (gas-liquid) 
  
 
Dust 
  
 
Aerosol 
  
Hazard Classification Physical Hazards Explosives Mass explosion hazard 
   
Projection hazard 
   
Fire hazard or minor projection 
hazard 
   
No significant hazard 
   
Very insensitive substances 
with mass explosion hazard 
   
Extremely insensitive articles 
with no mass explosion hazard 
  
Flammable 
 
  
Combustible 
 
  
Oxidizing 
 
  
Gases Under Pressure Steam 
  
Self-Reactive Substances 
 
  
Pyrophoric 
 
  
Self-Heating Substances 
 
  
Organic Peroxides 
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Corrosive to Metals 
 
  
Emit flammable gases when in 
contact with water/Dangerous 
when Wet Material 
 
 
Health Hazard 
Acute Toxicity/Poisonous 
Material  
  
Skin Corrosion/Irritation 
 
  
Serious Eye Damage/Eye 
Irritation  
  
Respiratory or Skin 
Sensitization  
  
Germ Cell Mutagenicity 
 
  
Carcinogenicity 
 
  
Reproductive Toxicology 
 
  
Target Organ Systemic Toxicity 
– Single Exposure  
  
Target Organ Systemic Toxicity 
– Repeated Exposure  
  
Aspiration Toxicity 
 
 
Environmental Hazards 
Hazardous to the Aquatic 
Environment  
   
Acute aquatic toxicity 
   
Chronic aquatic toxicity 
  
Bioaccumulation potential 
 
  
Rapid degradability 
 
Type Chemical Acids 
 
  
Bases 
 
  
Ammonia 
 
  
Chlorine 
 
  
Formulations 
 
  
Hetero-Organics 
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Hydrocarbons Crude Oil 
   
Natural Gas  
   
LPG 
   
Gasoline, diesel, fuel oil or 
other petroleum product which 
is liq@ ambient conditions 
  
Inorganic compounds 
 
  
Oxy-Organics Oxidizer 
   
Organic Peroxide 
  
Paints and Dyes 
 
  
Polychlorinated Biphenyls 
 
  
Polymers 
 
  
Volatile Organic Compounds 
 
  
Mixtures 
 
Use Pesticides/Agricultural Organochlorine compound 
 
  
Organophosphorous 
compound  
  
Pyrethrin 
 
  
Pyrethroid 
 
  
Dipyridyl compound 
 
  
Chlorophenoxy compound 
 
  
Triazines 
 
  
Thiocarbamates 
 
  
Organo-metallic compound 
 
  
Coumarins 
 
  
Indandiones 
 
  
Convulsants 
 
  
Microbial 
 
  
Dithiocarbamates 
 
  
AChE inhibitors 
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Unidentified cholinesterase 
inhibitor  
  
Includes one or more active 
ingredients  
 
Radiological Radioactive Materials 
 
 
Biological Toxic Materials 
 
  
Infectious substance 
 
 
Medical Magnetized Material 
 
  
Hazardous Waste 
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Equipment Taxonomy 
Storage Equipment Storage Tank Atmospheric Storage Liquid storage Single-containment 
  
   
 
Tank with 
protective 
outershell 
  
   
 
Double 
containment 
  
   
 
Full containment 
(liquid-vapor)  
  
   
 
Membrane 
  
   
 
In-ground tank 
  
   
 
Mounded tank 
  
   
 
Floating Roof Tank Cone-roof 
 
   
 
 Dome-roof 
 
   
 
 Dry-seal 
 
   Solid storage 
Silo 
  
   
 
Hopper 
  
  
Pressurized Tank Bullet Tank 
   
  
 
Storage Sphere 
   
  
Refrigerated Storage Cryogenic tank 
   
 
Container Storage  
Cylinder (compressed 
gas)  
   
  
Drum/barrel 
 
   
  
Bag 
 
   
  
Sampling container 
 
   
 
Storage Depot Pallets 
 
   
  
Big bags 
 
   
 
Salt Dome Storage 
  
   
 
Underground 
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storage 
Process Equipment 
Reactors and 
Reaction 
Equipment 
Reactors Non-pressurized Batch 
  
    
Semi-batch 
  
    
Continuous 
  
   
Pressurized Batch Autoclave 
 
    
Semi-batch 
  
   
 
Continuous 
Reforming 
Equipment 
Catalytic Reformer 
   
 
 
 
Reformer 
   
 
 
Cracking 
Equipment 
Catalytic Cracker 
    
  
Cracking Furnace 
  
    
Cracking Tower 
  
    
Hydrocracker 
  
    
Fluid cracker 
  
Reactor component 
Agitators and 
Stirrers 
Agitator 
  
  
 
 
Blender 
  
  
 
 
Mixer 
  
 
Heating and 
Cooling Equipment 
Cooling Equipment Air Cooler 
   
   
Cooler 
   
   
Cooling Tower 
   
   
Cooling water 
system 
   
   
Cryogenic 
equipment 
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Refrigeration unit 
 
   
Fin fan cooler 
 
  
Heating Equipment Concentrator 
 
   
Drier 
rotary 
dryers  
    
spray 
dryers 
    
flash 
dryers 
   
Reboiler 
 
 
 
 
Furnace 
 
  
 
Incinerator 
 
  
 
Kiln 
 
  
 
Oven 
 
  
 
Heating Coils 
 
  
Heat Exchanger 
Shell and tube heat 
exchanger 
 
  
 
Plate heat exchanger 
 
  
Phase change equipment Condenser 
 
  
 
Crystallizer 
 
  
 
Evaporator 
 
  
 
Vaporizer 
 
 
Relief Equipment Safety Relief Valve 
 
 
  
Rupture Disc 
 
 
  
Knockout Drum 
 
 
  
Header System 
 
 
 
Separation Equipment Liquid-liquid separation Decanting Vessel 
 
  
Fractionating equipment Distillation Column Stripper 
  
Gas-liquid separation Absorption 
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Scrubber 
 
  
Membrane separation 
 
 
  
   
  
Solid-Gas Separation Filter 
 
  
 
Cyclone 
 
  
 
Precipitator 
 
  
Solid-liquid separation Adsorption 
 
   
Centrifuge 
 
   
Dessicator 
 
   
Filter 
 
   
Ion exchange bed 
 
   
Settling 
 
  
Solid-solid Sieve 
 
 
Pressure Raising or 
Reducing Equipment 
Compressor Strainer 
 
   
Blower 
 
  
Pump Vacuum compressor 
 
   
Canned pump Impellor 
  
Pump or Compressor 
Components 
Pump bearing 
 
  
 
Pump drive 
 
  
 
Pump gearbox 
 
  
 
Pump gland 
 
  
 
Pump manifold 
 
  
 
Seal 
 
  
Ejector Equipment 
 
 
    
 
 
Physical Processes 
Equipment 
Mixer 
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Crystallization 
 
 
  
Adsorption 
 
 
  
Dryer 
 
 
 
Packaging Equipment 
  
 
 
Intermediate process 
storage equipment 
Pressure Vessel 
 
 
  
Atmospheric vessel 
 
 
 
Process Control and 
Instrumentation   
 Pipes and Fittings Supply piping/line Inlet Body of Pipe 
 
   
Joint 
 
   
Elbow 
 
   
Tee 
 
  
Outlet Body of Pipe 
 
   
Joint 
 
   
Elbow 
 
   
Tee 
 
 
Intra-piping Valve Drain cock 
 
   
Automatic valve 
 
   
Lever operated valve 
 
   
Manually operated 
valve 
 
   
Ball valve 
 
   
Bonnet valve 
 
   
Control valve 
 
   
Emergency Shutdown 
Fast acting 
valve 
   
Foot valve 
 
   
Gate valve 
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Non-return valve 
 
   
Petcock valve 
 
   
Steam trap 
 
 
 
 
Safety Relief valve 
 
 
Blind or Spade or Slip plate 
  
 
 
Connector Bellows 
 
 
  
Bonnet Joint 
 
 
  
Compression Fitting 
 
 
  
Coupling 
 
 
  
Expansion joint 
 
 
  
Flange 
 
 
  
Gasket 
 
 
 
Drains and Sewers Drainage System 
 
 
  
Effluent pond 
 
 
  
Floating Roof Drain 
 
 
  
Manhole 
 
 
  
Sewer 
 
 
  
Sump 
 
 
  
Waste Water Treatment 
 
 
 
Hose 
  
 
 
Insulation 
  
 
 
Manifold 
  
 
 
Nozzle 
  
 
 
Pipe Support 
  
 Transfer Equipment Pump 
  
 
 
Compressor 
  
 
 
Hoses 
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Gravity flow/chute 
  
 
 
Mechanical transport Conveyor 
 
 
  
Crane 
 
 
 
Transfer interface Loading Equipment 
 
 
  
Unloading Equipment 
 
 Pipeline Body of Pipe 
  
 
 
Joint 
  
 
 
Pipe seam 
  
 
 
Compressor station 
  
 
 
Regulator/metering system 
  
 
 
Scraper trap 
  
 
 
Bolted fitting 
  
 
 
Welded fitting 
  
 
 
Girth weld 
  
 
 
Sump 
  
 
 
Repair sleeve 
  
 
 
Service line 
  
 Electrical Equipment Transformer 
  
 
 
Capacitor 
  
 
 
Generator 
  
 
 
Battery 
  
 
 
Cable Powerline 
 
 
 
Electrical isolators and 
switches   
 
 
Motor Pump-motor 
 
 
  
Stirrer-motor 
 
 
 
Drilling Equipment 
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Junction box 
  
 Process Control and 
Instrumentation 
Computer 
  
 
 
Control box 
  
 
 
Control cable 
  
 
 
Control room 
  
 
 
Instrument or controller Flow meter or control 
 
 
  
Level meter or control 
 
 
  
Process Analyzer 
Analyzer designed to 
detect oxygen 
 
   
Analyzer designed to 
detect moisture 
 
   
Analyzer designed to 
detect acidity, pH 
 
  
Pressure meter or control 
  
  
Temperature meter or 
control  
 
  
Viscosity meter 
 
 
  
Weighing scale 
 
 Protective and Safety 
Equipment 
Containment doors 
  
 
 
Emergency equipment 
  
 
 
Explosion suppression 
  
 
 
Fire fighting equipment Fire extinguisher 
 
 
  
Sprinklers 
 
 
 
Fire Protection Equipment Fire/flame detector 
  
  
Fire alarm 
  
  
Smoke alarm 
  
  
Flame arrester 
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Fuseable Link 
  
 
Gas Detector 
Flammable gas/vapor 
detector  
 
  
Toxic gas/vapor detector 
 
 
 
Overpressure relief Bursting disc 
 
 
  
Safety Relief Valve 
 
 
  
Explosion relief 
 
 
  
Vacuum relief 
 
 
 
Personal Protective 
Equipment 
Breathing Apparatus 
 
 
  
Clothing 
 
 
 
Safety Shower 
  
 
 
Vent Systems Chimney 
 
 
  
Exhaust 
 
 
  
Exhaust blower 
 
 
  
Vent System 
 
 Ancillary Process 
Equipment 
Rail Car 
  
 
 
Hydraulic System 
  
 
 
Disposal/Waste Treatment Incinerator 
 
 
  
Flare Stack 
 
 
  
Waste water treatment 
 
 Solids Processing 
Equipment 
Ball mill 
  
 
 
Chopper 
  
 
 
Crumbling machine 
  
 
 
Cutter 
  
 
 
Extruder 
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Flaker 
  
 
 
Granulator 
  
 
 
Grater 
  
 
 
Grinder 
  
 
 
Pelletizer 
  
 
 
Pebble mill 
  
 Mechanical Handling 
Equipment 
Conveyor 
  
 
 
Chute 
  
 
 
Fan 
  
 
 
Hopper feeder 
  
 
 
Lifting equipment Crane 
 
 
  
Elevator 
 
 
  
Lifting Hoist 
 
 
  
Winch 
 
 
  
Wire Rope 
 
 
 
Winding Machine 
  
 Heating/Cooling for 
building    
 Ventilation System 
   
 Laboratory Equipment 
   
 Tools and Access 
Equipment 
Hand Tools Hydraulic Jack 
 
 
 
Power tools Abrasive wheel 
 
 
  
Drill 
 
 
  
Electric sander 
 
 
  
Grinding wheel 
 
 
 
Ladder 
 
 
 
 Scaffolding   
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Power Plant Engine   
 
 Turbine   
 
 Turbo Generator   
 Transport Equipment Air transport Aircraft 
 
 
 
 
Helicopter 
 
 
 Loading/Unloading Point 
Loading Arm 
 
 
 
 
Ship or Shore Connection 
 
 
 
 
Terminal 
 
 
 
Marine Transport Container Ship 
 
 
  
Marine Freighter 
 
 
  
Marine Tanker 
 
 
  
Passenger Ship 
 
 
 
Rails Transport Freight Train 
 
 
  
Rail Tanker 
 
 
  
Rail Wagon 
 
 
 
River Transport River Barge 
 
 
  
River Tanker 
 
 
 
Road Transport Bulldozer or JCB or Digger 
 
 
  
Forklift Truck 
 
 
  
Lorry 
 
 
  
Road Tanker 
 
 
  
Road Vehicle 
 
 
 
Vehicle fuel tank and 
associated piping 
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Operation Taxonomy 
Construction 
   
Demolition 
   
Exploration 
   Offshore 
   Operational Activities Commissioning 
  
 
Decommissioning 
  
 
Startup 
  
 
Shutdown 
  
 
Emergency 
  
 
Inspection 
  
 
Normal Operations Draining 
 
  
Purging 
 
  
Sampling 
 
  
Valve Operation 
 
 
Testing 
  
 
Maintenance Cleaning 
 
  
Entry into Confined Space 
 
  
Hot Work 
 
  
Line Break 
 
  
Preparation for 
Maintenance 
 
  
Repair 
 Processing Material transfer Charging Reactor/dosing 
 
  
Loading 
 
  
Unloading 
 
 
Heat transfer Condensation 
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Cooling 
 
  
Evaporation 
 
  
Heating 
 
  
Vaporization 
 
 
Reaction Batch Reaction Catalytic batch reaction 
  
 Thermal batch reaction 
  
Continuous Reaction Catalytic continuous 
reaction 
  
 
Thermal continuous 
reaction 
  
Polymerization 
 
 
Solids processing Extrusion 
 
  
Milling 
 
  
Molding 
 
 
Separation Centrifuging 
 
  
Distillation 
 
  
Filtration 
 
  
Refining 
 
  
Settling 
 
 
Mixing 
  
 
Venting 
  Labwork 
   Storage 
   
Warehousing 
   
Transportation Rail 
  
 
Road 
  
 
Air 
  
 
Marine 
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River 
  
 
Pipeline 
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Causes Taxonomy 
Process Upsets Overpressure 
Internal overpressure (Gas 
material) 
Combustion/explosion causes 
overpressure 
   
External HP source connected causes 
overpressure 
   
Internal high pressure causes 
overpressure 
   
Overcompression causes 
overpressure 
   
Runaway (side) reaction causes 
overpressure 
  
Internal overpressure (liquid) 
Overfilling vessel causes 
overpressure 
   
Pump causes overpressure 
   
Runaway (side) reaction causes 
overpressure 
   
Thermal expansion of liquid filled 
vessel causes overpressure 
   
Back pressure wave causes 
overpressure 
   
Combustion/explosion causes 
overpressure 
   
Roll-over of vessel contents causes 
overpressure 
   
Freezing and expansion of aqueous 
phase 
  
Internal overpressure (solid 
material) 
Dust explosion overpressures 
enclosure 
   
Unstable solid explodes 
 
Underpressure 
Underpressure (pressure below 
the containment limit of the 
vessel) 
Chemical reaction consuming gases 
   
Condensation 
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Decrease of pressure due to a 
decrease of the temperature 
   
Fast emptying of the vessel 
  
Underpressure (pressure below 
the containment limit of the 
roof) 
Condensation 
   
Decrease of pressure due to a 
decrease of the temperature 
   
Chemical action consuming gases 
   
Fast emptying of the vessel or tank 
 
Overheating High temperature Fire (domino effect) 
   
Chemical energy (domino effect) 
   
Furnace, boiler, motor other 
unshielded hot surface 
   
Heat transport canalisation 
   
Resisting electric conductor 
(resistance, short-circuit) 
   
Electric arc (defect of the electric 
installation, arc welding) 
   
Combustion flame or heat (gas flame 
welding, smoking) 
   
Natural event (lightning) 
   
Hot missile (domino effect) 
  
Temporary (or permanent) 
energy source  
Fire (domino effect) 
 
 
 
Chemical energy (domino effect) 
   
Furnace, boiler, motor other 
unshielded hot surface 
   
Heat transport canalisation 
   
Magnifying glass 
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Resisting electric conductor 
(resistance, short-circuit) 
   
Friction (conveyors, doors, 
mechanical devices) 
   
Spark (mechanical) 
   
Spark (static electricity) 
   
Electric arc (defect of the electric 
installation, arc welding) 
   
Impact 
 
  
Combustion flame or heat (gas flame 
welding, smoking) 
 
  
Natural event (lightning) 
 
  
Hot missile (domino effect) 
 
Overfilling Overflow  
 
Underfilling 
 
 
 
Incorrect flow Incorrect flow rate Flow rate too high 
  
 
Flow rate too low 
  Backflow  
  Overflow  
  Reverse flow  
 
Incorrect temperature High temperature  
  Low temperature  
 
Exothermic reaction 
 
 
 
Flameout 
 
 
 
Frothing 
 
 
 
Leak Air leaking into system  
  Flange leak  
  Gasket leak  
  Joint leak  
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  Relief valve Leak  
 
Low level of catalyst 
 
 
 
Roll-over stratified liquid 
layers (due to 
temperature/density 
differences) 
Vapor cloud release 
 
Chemical Causes 
Accidental 
mixing/Contamination 
Contact with a combustible 
(reducing) substance 
Presence of an incompatible reagent 
in the storage room 
   
Leak, entrainment from a nearby 
pipe or vessel (domino effect) 
   
Accidental contamination 
   
The reducing substances is part of 
the stored/used chemical (organic 
peroxide) 
  
Contact with an incompatible 
reagent 
Presence of an incompatible reagent 
in the storage room 
   
Leak, entrainment from a nearby 
pipe or vessel (domino effect) 
   
Contamination by natural elements 
of the environment (air, water) 
   
Accidental contamination 
  
Presence of a catalyst  (if 
involved) 
Abnormal presence of a catalyst 
  
 
Leak, entrainment from a nearby 
pipe or vessel (domino effect) 
   
Accidental contamination 
  
Presence of air vector Aeration 
   
Wind 
   
Gas escaping from a breach or leak 
(domino effect) 
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Air projection due to fall, collapse or 
explosion of a nearby equipment 
(domino effect) 
   
Exhaust gases 
  
Presence of liquid vector Liquid escaping from a leak or breach 
   
Extinction water 
   
Natural event 
   
Other water sources 
 
Oxygen Enrichment Presence of oxidizing substance Normal storage/use 
   
Abnormal storage/use 
   
Leak, entrainment from a nearby 
equipment (domino effect) 
   
Other accidental contamination 
 
Potentially mobile material Fragmented material 
 
  
Soluble material 
 
  
Material susceptible to emit 
vapours (e.g. solvent)  
 
Hazardous material storage Storage of a flammable product 
 
  
Storage of a reaction sensitive 
chemical  
  
Storage of a thermal 
decomposition sensitive 
chemical 
 
 
Hazardous material use 
Use of a highly reactive 
substance  
  
Use of an explosive material 
 
  
Use of a flammable substance 
 
 
 
Use of a toxic substance 
 
 Chemical missing Low level of catalyst 
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Lack of stabilizer/inhibitor 
 
  
Oxygen deficiency 
 
 
Incompatible material of 
construction   
 
Incorrect chemical 
concentration   
 
Unwanted chemical reaction Runaway reaction 
 
  
Decomposition 
 
  
Autoignition 
 
  
Spontaneous combustion Hypergolic liquids mixing 
  
Thermite reaction Al + Fe2O3  reaction 
  
Unwanted polymerization 
 
Equipment Failure 
Material of construction 
failure 
Brittle rupture Brittle structure 
   
Impact 
  
Degradation of the mechanical 
properties leads to incapacity to 
sustain high pressure 
Corrosion 
   
Erosion 
   
Fatigue 
   
Fracture 
    
   
Thermal weakening (lowering of the 
tensile or compressive stength under 
the effect of high temperature) 
   
Other chemical action of the 
environment (solvent on plastic 
structure) 
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Other physical action on the 
environment (light on plastics) 
 
  
Aging 
 
  
Rusting 
 
  
Stress 
 
  
Embrittlement 
  
Insufficient Initial mechanical 
properties of the structure 
(below normal use conditions) 
Inappropriate material 
   
Inappropriate dimnensions 
   
Inappropriate assembling 
  
Excessive external stress Overloading 
   
High amplitude vibrations 
   
Dilation 
   
External overpressure 
   
Shear stress 
 
Instrumentation failure 
  
 
Control failure Computer system failure 
 
 
Equipment missing Open manhole 
 
 
Incorrect equipment installed 
  
 
Additional equipment 
installed 
insulating plate 
 
 
Electrical Equipment Failure Power supply failure 
 
  
Generator failure 
 
  
Motor failure 
 
  
Short circuit 
 
  
Lack of earthing 
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Spark 
 
  
Electric arc (defect of the electric 
installation, arc welding)  
 
Mechanical equipment failure Accidental opening Disconnect during filling 
   
Valve opened by mistake 
 
 
 
Valve left open by mistake 
 
 
 
External force causes accidental 
opening 
 
 
 
Valve blocked 
 
 
 
Seal, joint loss of effectiveness 
 
 
 
Safety valve, safety relief device 
 
 
 
Fail to clear out contents before 
opening containment 
 
 
 
Wrong part (containing hazardous 
material) worked on 
 
 
 
Operation started when containment 
open 
 
 
 
Uncontrolled flow during 
sampling/draining 
 
 
Leak Air leaking into system 
 
 
 Flange leak 
 
 
 Gasket leak 
 
 
 Joint leak 
 
 
 Relief valve Leak 
 
 
Blower failure 
 
 
 
Fittings failure Bolt failure 
 
 
 Bearing failure 
 
 
 Joint failure 
 
 
 Flange failure 
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 Flexible coupling failure 
 
 
 Gasket failure 
 
 
 Valve failure 
 
 
Hose failure 
 
 
 
Lining failure 
 
 
 
Pipeline failure 
 
 
 
Seal failure 
 
 
 
Tube failure 
 
 
 
Equipment misalignment 
 
 
 
Cooling tower collapse 
 
 
 
Floating roof failure 
 
 
 
Pump failure 
 
 
 
Refractory failure 
 
 
 
Shaft failure 
 
 
 
Tank failure 
 
 
 
Vessel failure 
 
 Safety Equipment failure Alarm failure 
 
 
 
Bursting Disc Failure 
 
 
 
Safety Relief Valve Failure 
 
 
 
Detection system failure 
 
 
Ignition source Fire (domino effect) 
 
  
Chemical energy (domino effect) 
 
  
Furnace, boiler, motor other 
unshielded hot surface  
  
Heat transport canalisation 
 
 
 
Magnifying glass 
 
 
 
Resisting electric conductor 
(resistance, short-circuit) 
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Friction 
 
 
 
Spark (mechanical) 
 
 
 
Spark (static electricity) 
 
 
 
Electric arc (defect of the electric 
installation, arc welding) 
 
 
 
Impact 
 
 
 
Combustion flame or heat 
 
 
 
Natural event (lightning) 
 
 
 
Hot missile (domino effect) 
 
 
Utility failure Air system failure 
 
 
 
Fuel supply failure Gas supply failure 
 
 
Hydraulic failure 
 
 
 
Inert gas supply failure Nitrogen supply failure 
 
 
Lubrication failure 
 
 
 
Power supply failure 
 
 
 
Steam failure 
 
 
 
Water failure 
 
Organizational 
Inadequate policy formulation  
  
 
Inadequate policy 
implementation 
Budget cuts 
 
 
 
Communication inadequacy 
 
 
 
Inadequate definition of 
line/staff responsibility 
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Risk assessment & 
Control System 
adequacy 
Inadequate Hazard Analysis 
process 
Inadequate risk analysis and 
tolerance criteria 
  
 
  
Standards & codes 
requirement specifications 
  
 
  
Design & development 
inadequacy 
Inspection planning 
 
 
  
 
Maintenance planning 
 
 
  
 
Human factors 
(ergonomics) review 
 
 
  
 
Emergency shutdown 
provision 
 
 
  
 
Management of Change 
(MOC) provision 
 
 
   
Operational readiness Inadequate Training 
 
   
 
Pre Startup Safety 
Review (PSSR) 
 
   
 
Emergency 
provisions 
 
 
   Lockouts 
 
 
 
  
Permit to Work 
System Inadequate 
 
 
Environment, Safety & 
Health (ES&H) program 
review 
  
 
Human Error Operational error Slip (Attentional failure) Operator/Crew fatigue 
 
 
  
Lapse (Memory failure) 
  
 
  
Mistake (Lack of knowledge, 
faulty procedure)   
 
  
Violation (Intention failure) 
circumvention: 'does not 
happen to me' attitude  
 
   
Drug misuse 
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Cigarette smoking 
 
 
  
Operation inadequate, 
wrong, unnecessary 
Inadequate cleaning 
  
 
Inadequate testing 
  
 
Inadequate identification 
  
 
Inadequate installation 
  
 
Inadequate inspection 
  
 
Incorrect labelling 
  
Operation Omitted Atmosphere not tested 
   
Bund Drain left open 
 
Design error Inadequate design 
 
  
Inadequate standards 
applied 
Machinery not guarded 
 
Document error Inadequate documentation Map inadequate 
 
Maintenance/repair 
Inadequate isolation of 
equipment/system  
 
 
Inadequate maintenance 
work operation  
 
Procedure error Faulty instructions 
 
 
 
Incorrect cleaning procedure 
 
 
 
Inadequate maintenance 
procedure  
 
 
Safety procedures 
inadequate  
 Shift change Inadequate communication  
 Tool unsatisfactory   
External 
Events 
Deliberate acts Arson 
 
  
Terrorism 
 
  
Vandalism 
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Sabotage 
 
  
War Bomb 
   
Missile 
 
External aggression Plane Crash 
 
  
Transportation accident Road incidents 
   
Rail incidents 
   
Shipping incidents 
   
Plane crash 
  
Domino Effect Fire (domino effect) 
   
Chemical energy (domino 
effect) 
   
Hot missile (domino effect) 
  
Excessive vibration 
 
  
Friction heat 
 
 
Natural Phenomenon Weather effects Rain 
   
Snow 
   
Ice 
   
Lightning 
   
Wind, gale, storm 
  
Avalanche 
 
  
Earth movements 
 
  
Flooding Lifting of tanks 
   
fracture of pipelines 
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Consequences Taxonomy 
 
People Fatality 
 
 
 
 
Injuries Bruises/fractures 
 
 
 
 
Asphyxiation 
 
 
  
Electric Shock 
 
 
  
Scalding/burning 
 
 
  
Poisoning 
 
 
  
Radioactive 
 
 
 
Evacuation 
 
 
 Environment Polluting Spill Ecological damage Air 
 
 
  
Water 
 
  
 
Soil 
 
  
 
Flora 
 
  
 
Fauna 
 Plant/Property/Equipment Plant shutdown 
 
 
 
 
Damage to 
equipment 
 
 
 
 
Boilover 
 
 
 
 
Capsize of platform 
 
 
 
 
Leak/Rupture Pipe leak/rupture 
 
 
  
Tank leak/rupture 
 
 
 
Collapse Vessel collapse 
 
 
  
Tankroof collapse 
 
 
 
Blowout 
   
 
Vessel overturned 
 
 
 
 
Contamination of 
product 
 
 
 
 
Product loss 
 
 
 Fire Liquid substance fire Poolfire 
  
  
Tank fire 
Boilover and 
resulting poolfire 
 
  
Conflagration 
  
  
Toxic cloud 
  
  
Ecological damage 
  
 
Two-phase 
substance fire 
Jetfire 
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Poolfire 
  
  
Flashfire 
  
  
Fireball (often after 
BLEVE) 
  
  
Conflagration 
 
 
  
Toxic cloud 
 
 
  
Ecological damage 
  
 
Gas/vapor 
substance fire 
Flashfire 
 
 
 
 
Conflagration 
  
 
 
Toxic cloud 
 
 
 
 
Ecological damage 
  Implosion 
 
 
 
 
Explosion Physical Explosion 
Compressed gas/vapor 
explosion 
Overpressure 
generation  
   
Missiles ejection 
 
  
BLEVE Heat radiation 
 
   
Overpressure 
generation  
   
Missiles ejection 
 
  
Rapid phase transition 
explosion 
Overpressure 
generation  
 
Chemical Explosion 
Deflagration/Detonation 
Vapor Cloud 
Explosion 
Heat radiation  
  
 
 
Overpressure 
generation 
  
 
Aerosol explosion Heat radiation 
  
 
 
Overpressure 
generation 
  
 
Gas explosion Heat radiation 
  
 
 
Overpressure 
generation 
  
 
 
Missiles ejection 
  
 
Dust explosion Heat radiation 
  
 
 
Overpressure 
generation 
  
 
 
Missiles ejection 
  
 
Condensed phase Overpressure 
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explosion generation 
  
  
Missiles ejection                    
  
  
Heat radiation  
  
Homogeneous chemical 
explosion 
Runaway reaction 
and explosion 
Overpressure 
generation              
  
 
 
Missiles ejection  
  
 
 
Toxic release 
Internal fire/explosion 
 
 
 
 
Release of Substance 
Toxic gas/vapor 
release 
 
 
 
 
Flammable 
gas/vapor release 
Gas/vapor substance 
fire  
 
  
Explosion 
 
 
 
Liquid/solid release 
to Air 
polluting spill 
 
 
 
Liquid/solid release 
to Water 
polluting spill 
 
 
 
Liquid/solid release 
to Ground 
polluting spill 
 
 Near miss 
 
 
 
 Transport effect Collision 
 
 
 
 
Sinking 
 
 
 
 
Derailment-
consequence 
 
 
 Other 
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Barriers Taxonomy 
Avoidance Inherently safe design 
 
 Prevention Inherently safer Design 
 
 
 Mechanical Integrity  
 
 
Preventive barriers Inerting   
  Coating  
 
Safety Management System Management of Change 
 
  
Procedures 
 
  
Safety Culture 
 
  
Periodic Inspection 
 
  
Maintenance 
 
  
Training 
 
 
Basic Process Control 
System (BPCS) 
Software driven steering of 
process 
 
 
Operator  Action 
Supervision/Interven-tion 
on Alarms 
 
 
Back-up system 
 
 
 
Security System 
 
 Protection Facility spacing and layout 
 
 
 
Detection system, alarms 
and operator intervention  
 
 
Supervisor Intervention 
 
 
 
Automatic SIS system 
Detector, processor, 
actuator combination 
explosion suppression 
   
isolation valve closing 
 
Isolation system Fast acting valve  
 
  
rotary valve  
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flame arrester 
 
 
Physical Protection Double Containment 
 
  
Relief Valve 
 
 
Ignition Control Electrical Area Classification 
 
 Static electricity, lightning, 
and stray current protection 
  Mitigation Active Systems Fire Suppression Sprinkler 
   Deluge system 
   Foam system 
   Fire extinguishers 
  
Explosion vents 
 
  
Water curtains 
 
  
Steam curtains 
 
 
Passive Systems 
Personal Protection 
Equipment 
 
  
Dike/Bund 
 
  
Containment and Drainage 
 
  
Fireproofing/firewall 
 
  
Sufficient spacing/distance 
to risk source 
Facility spacing and 
layout 
 
Community/Plant 
Emergency Response 
Decontamination 
 
  
Fire Extinction 
 
 
External fire & rescue 
service 
Self-rescue possibilities 
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Access routes, water 
 
  
Fire fighting 
 
  
Medical treatment 
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APPENDIX D 
The modified incident taxonomy is shown below: 
Chemicals Taxonomy 
State Gas 
  
 
Liquid 
  
 
Solid 
  
 
Two-phase  (gas-liquid) 
  
 
Dust 
  
 
Aerosol 
  
Hazard Classification Physical Hazards Explosivity 
 
  
Reactivity 
 
  
Water reactive 
 
  
Flammability 
 
  
Combustiblity 
 
  
Oxidizing Agent 
 
  
Pyrophoric 
 
  
Pressure, High Steam 
  
Vacuum 
 
  
Corrosivity 
 
  
Temperature, High 
 
  
Temperature, Low (freezing) 
 
 
Health Hazard Acute Toxicity 
 
  
Chronic Toxicity 
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Irritant/Sensitizer 
 
  
Mutagenicity 
 
  
Carcinogenicity 
 
  
Asphyxiant 
 
 
Environmental Hazards Water 
 
  
Air 
 
  
Soil 
 
Type Acids 
  
 
Bases 
  
 
Ammonia 
  
 
Chlorine 
  
 
Hydrocarbons Crude Oil 
 
  
Natural Gas  
 
  
LPG 
 
  
Gasoline, diesel, fuel oil or other 
petroleum product which is liq@ 
ambient conditions 
 
 Other organics 
  
 
Inorganic compounds 
  
 
Paints and Dyes 
  
 
Polychlorinated Biphenyls 
  
 
Polymers 
  
 
Volatile Organic Compounds 
  
 
Mixtures 
  
Use Pesticides/Agricultural 
  
 
Radiological Radioactive Materials 
 
 
Biological Toxic Materials 
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Infectious substance 
 
 
Medical Magnetized Material 
 
  
Hazardous Waste 
 
 
Insecticide 
  
 
Bactericide 
  
 
Preservative 
  
 
Solvent 
  
 
Chemical reagent 
  
 
Refrigerant 
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Equipment Taxonomy 
Storage Equipment Tanks/Vessels Atmospheric Tank 
  
  
Pressurized Tank 
 
 
  
Refrigerated Storage 
 
 
  
Bullet Tank 
 
 
  
Floating Roof Tank 
 
 
 
Solids Storage Hopper 
 
 
  
Silo 
 
 
 
Gas containers Cylinder (compressed gas) 
 
 
 
Other storage Drum/barrel 
 
 
  
Bag 
 
 
  
Sampling container 
 
 
 
 
Storage Depot/hangar 
 
 
 
 
Salt Dome Storage 
 
 
  
Underground storage 
 
 
  
Pallets 
 
 Process Equipment Reactors Batch 
  
  
Continuous 
  
  
Semi-batch 
  
  
Liquid phase 
  
  
Vapor phase 
  
  
Catalytic 
 
 
  
Stirred Tank 
 
 
  
Tubular 
 
 
 
Reforming Equipment Catalytic Reformer 
 
 
  
Other Reformer 
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Cracking Equipment Catalytic Cracker 
  
  
Cracking Furnace 
  
  
Cracking Tower 
  
 
Hydrotreaters Hydrocracker 
  
  
Fluid cracker 
  
 
Heating and Cooling 
Equipment 
Cooling Equipment Air Cooler 
 
   
Cooler 
 
   
Cooling Tower 
 
   
Cooling water system 
 
   
Cryogenic equipment 
 
   
Refrigeration unit 
 
   
Fin fan cooler 
 
  
Heating Equipment Concentrator 
 
   
Drier 
 
   
Reboiler 
 
 
 
 
Furnace 
 
  
 
Incinerator 
 
  
 
Kiln 
 
  
 
Oven 
 
  
 
Heating Coils 
 
  
Heat Exchanger 
Shell and tube heat 
exchanger 
 
  
 
Plate heat exchanger 
 
  
Phase change equipment Condenser 
 
  
 
Crystallizer 
 
  
 
Evaporator 
 
  
 
Vaporizer 
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Relief Equipment & 
Systems 
Pressure Relief Device Pressure Safety Valve 
 
   
Rupture Disc 
 
  
Knockout Drum 
 
 
  
Header System 
 
 
 
Separation Equipment Liquid-liquid separation Decanting Vessel 
 
  
Fractionating equipment Distillation Column Stripper 
  
Gas-liquid separation Absorption 
 
   
Scrubber 
 
  
 
Stripper 
 
  
Membrane separation 
 
 
  
Solid-Gas Separation Filter 
 
  
 
Cyclone 
 
  
 
Precipitator 
 
  
Solid-liquid separation Adsorption 
 
   
Centrifuge 
 
   
Dessicator 
 
   
Filter 
 
   
Ion exchange bed 
 
   
Settling 
 
   
Strainer 
 
  
Solid-solid separation Sieve 
 
 
Pressure Raising or 
Reducing Equipment 
Compressor Strainer 
 
   
Blower 
 
  
Pump Vacuum compressor 
 
   
Canned pump 
 
  
Pump or Compressor 
Components 
Impellor 
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Pump bearing 
 
  
 
Pump drive 
 
  
 
Pump gearbox 
 
  
 
Pump gland 
 
  
 
Pump manifold 
 
  
 
Seal 
 
  
Ejector Equipment 
 
 
 
Physical Processes 
Equipment 
Mixer 
 
 
  
Crystallization 
 
 
  
Adsorption 
 
 
  
Dryer 
 
 
 
Packaging Equipment 
  
 
 
Intermediate Equipment 
  
 Pipes/Fittings/Valves Piping Process pipes Body of Pipe 
 
   
Joint 
 
   
Elbow 
 
   
Tee 
 
  
Pipeline Body of Pipe 
 
   
Joint 
 
   
Pipe seam 
 
   
Compressor station 
 
   
Regulator/metering 
system 
 
   
Scraper trap 
 
   
Bolted fitting 
 
   
Welded fitting 
 
   
Girth weld 
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Sump 
 
   
Repair sleeve 
 
   
Service line 
 
 
Connector Bellows 
 
 
  
Bonnet Joint 
 
 
  
Compression Fitting 
 
 
  
Coupling 
 
 
  
Expansion joint 
 
 
  
Flange 
 
 
  
Gasket 
 
 
 
Valves Manually operated valve Control valve 
 
   
Drain cock 
 
   
Lever operated valve 
 
  
Automatic valve Ball valve 
 
   
Bonnet valve 
 
   
Control valve 
 
   
Emergency Shutdown 
 
   
Foot valve 
 
   
Gate valve 
 
   
Non-return valve 
 
   
Petcock valve 
 
   
Steam trap 
 
   
Safety Relief valve 
 
 
Drains and Sewers Drainage System 
 
 
  
Effluent pond 
  
  
Floating Roof Drain 
  
  
Manhole 
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Sewer 
 
 
  
Sump 
 
 
  
Waste Water Treatment 
 
 
 
 
Nozzle 
 
 
 
 
Pipe Support 
 
 
 
Hose 
  
 
 
Insulation 
  
 
 
Manifold 
  
 Transfer Equipment Pump 
  
 
 
Compressor 
  
 
 
Hoses 
  
 
 
Gravity flow/chute 
  
 
 
Mechanical transport Conveyor 
 
 
  
Crane 
 
 
 
Transfer interface Loading Equipment 
 
 
  
Unloading Equipment 
 
 Electrical Equipment Transformer 
  
 
 
Capacitor 
  
 
 
Generator 
  
 
 
Battery 
  
 
 
Cable Powerline 
 
 
 
Electrical isolators and 
switches   
 
 
Motor Pump-motor 
 
 
  
Stirrer-motor 
 
 
 
Drilling Equipment 
  
 
 
Junction box 
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Process Control and 
Instrumentation 
Computer 
  
 
 
Control box 
  
 
 
Control cable 
  
 
 
Control room 
  
 
 
Instrument or controller Flow meter or control 
 
 
  
Level meter or control 
 
 
  
Process Analyzer 
 
 
  
Pressure meter or control 
  
  
Temperature meter or 
control  
 
  
Viscosity meter 
 
 
  
Weighing scale 
 
 Ancillary Process 
Equipment 
Hydraulic System 
  
 
 
Disposal/Waste Treatment Incinerator 
 
 
  
Flare Stack 
 
 
  
Waste water treatment 
 
 Solids Processing 
Equipment 
Ball mill 
  
 
 
Chopper 
  
 
 
Crumbling machine 
  
 
 
Cutter 
  
 
 
Extruder 
  
 
 
Flaker 
  
 
 
Granulator 
  
 
 
Grater 
  
 
 
Grinder 
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Pelletizer 
  
 
 
Pebble mill 
  
 Mechanical Handling 
Equipment 
Conveyor 
  
 
 
Chute 
  
 
 
Fan 
  
 
 
Hopper feeder 
  
 
 
Lifting equipment Crane 
 
 
  
Elevator 
 
 
  
Lifting Hoist 
 
 
  
Winch 
 
 
  
Wire Rope 
 
 
 
Winding Machine 
  
 Heating/Cooling for 
building    
 Ventilation System 
   
 Laboratory Equipment 
   
 Power Plant Engine   
 
 Turbine   
 
 Turbo Generator   
 Vehicles & Mobile 
Equipment 
Air transport Aircraft 
 
 
 
 
Helicopter 
 
 
 Loading/Unloading Point 
Loading Arm 
 
 
 
 
Ship or Shore Connection 
 
 
 
 
Terminal 
 
 
 
Marine Transport Container Ship 
 
 
  
Marine Freighter 
 
 
  
Marine Tanker 
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Passenger Ship 
 
 
 
Rails Transport Freight Train 
 
 
  
Rail Tanker 
 
 
  
Rail Wagon 
 
 
 
River Transport River Barge 
 
 
  
River Tanker 
 
 
 
Road Transport Bulldozer or JCB or Digger 
 
 
  
Forklift Truck 
 
 
  
Lorry 
 
 
  
Road Tanker 
 
 
  
Road Vehicle 
 
 
Facilities Warehouse 
 
 
 
 Refinery   
 
 Production Chemical Production  
 
 
 
Food/Beverage  
 
 
 
Pulp & paper 
 
 
 
 
Metal 
 
 
 Tank Farm   
 
 Offshore Platform   
 
 Pumping Station   
 
 Water Purification 
Wastewater 
 
 
 
 
Feed water 
 
 
 
Utility Cogen 
 
 
  
Boiler 
 
 
  
Cryogenic Separation 
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Operation Taxonomy 
Construction 
  
Demolition 
  
Exploration 
  
Drilling Offshore 
 
 
Onshore 
 Processing Commissioning 
 
 
Decommissioning 
 
 
Startup 
 
 
Shutdown 
 
 
Emergency 
 
 
Normal Operations Draining 
  
Purging 
  
Sampling 
  
Valve Operation 
  
Mixing 
 
Materials Handling 
 
 
Testing 
 
 
Maintenance/Inspection Cleaning 
  
Entry into Confined Space 
  
Hot Work 
  
Line Break 
  
Preparation for 
Maintenance 
  
Repair 
 
Batch Operation  
 
Upset condition  
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Non-routine operation  
 
Idle, Out-of-Service  
Transfer Loading tank truck  
 
Unloading tank truck  
 
Material transfer  
Labwork 
  
Storage 
 
 
Warehousing 
 
 
Transportation Rail  
 
Road  
 
Air  
 
Marine  
 
River  
 
Pipeline  
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Causes Taxonomy 
Process Upsets Overpressure 
Internal overpressure (Gas 
material) 
Combustion/explosion causes 
overpressure  
   
External HP source connected 
causes overpressure  
   
Internal high pressure causes 
overpressure  
   
Overcompression causes 
overpressure  
   
Runaway (side) reaction causes 
overpressure  
  
Internal overpressure (liquid) 
Overfilling vessel causes 
overpressure 
 
   
Pump causes overpressure 
 
   
Runaway (side) reaction causes 
overpressure 
 
   
Thermal expansion of liquid filled 
vessel causes overpressure 
 
   
Back pressure wave causes 
overpressure 
 
   
Combustion/explosion causes 
overpressure 
 
   
Roll-over of vessel contents causes 
overpressure 
 
   
Freezing and expansion of aqueous 
phase 
 
  
Internal overpressure (solid 
material) 
Dust explosion overpressures 
enclosure 
 
   
Unstable solid explodes 
 
 
Underpressure 
Underpressure (pressure below 
the containment limit of the 
vessel) 
Chemical reaction consuming 
gases 
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Condensation 
 
   
Decrease of pressure due to a 
decrease of the temperature 
 
   
Fast emptying of the vessel 
 
  
Underpressure (pressure below 
the containment limit of the roof) 
Condensation 
 
   
Decrease of pressure due to a 
decrease of the temperature 
 
   
Chemical action consuming gases 
 
   
Fast emptying of the vessel or tank 
 
 
Overheating High temperature Fire (domino effect) 
 
   
Chemical energy (domino effect) 
 
   
Furnace, boiler, motor other 
unshielded hot surface  
   
Heat transport canalisation 
 
   
Resisting electric conductor 
(resistance, short-circuit)  
   
Electric arc (defect of the electric 
installation, arc welding)  
   
Combustion flame or heat (gas 
flame welding, smoking)  
   
Natural event (lightning) 
 
   
Hot missile (domino effect) 
 
  
Temporary (or permanent) 
energy source  
Fire (domino effect) 
 
 
 
 
Chemical energy (domino effect) 
 
   
Furnace, boiler, motor other 
unshielded hot surface  
   
Heat transport canalisation 
 
   
Magnifying glass 
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Resisting electric conductor 
(resistance, short-circuit)  
   
Friction (conveyors, doors, 
mechanical devices)  
   
Spark (mechanical) 
 
   
Spark (static electricity) 
 
   
Electric arc (defect of the electric 
installation, arc welding)  
   
Impact 
 
 
  
Combustion flame or heat (gas 
flame welding, smoking)  
 
  
Natural event (lightning) 
 
 
  
Hot missile (domino effect) 
 
 
Overfilling Overflow   
 
Underfilling 
 
  
 
Incorrect flow Incorrect flow rate Flow rate too high  
  
 
Flow rate too low 
 
  Backflow   
  Overflow   
  Reverse flow   
 
Incorrect temperature High temperature   
  Low temperature   
 
Exothermic reaction 
 
  
 
Flameout 
 
  
 
Frothing 
 
  
 
Leak Air leaking into system   
  Flange leak   
  Gasket leak   
  Joint leak   
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  Relief valve Leak   
 
Low level of catalyst 
 
  
 
Roll-over stratified liquid 
layers (due to 
temperature/density 
differences) 
Vapor cloud release 
  
Chemical Causes 
Accidental 
mixing/Contamination 
Contact with a combustible 
(reducing) substance 
Presence of an incompatible 
reagent in the storage room 
 
   
Leak, entrainment from a nearby 
pipe or vessel (domino effect) 
 
   
Accidental contamination 
 
   
The reducing substances is part of 
the stored/used chemical (organic 
peroxide) 
 
  
Contact with an incompatible 
reagent 
Presence of an incompatible 
reagent in the storage room 
 
   
Leak, entrainment from a nearby 
pipe or vessel (domino effect) 
 
   
Contamination by natural 
elements of the environment (air, 
water) 
 
   
Accidental contamination 
 
  
Presence of a catalyst  (if 
involved) 
Abnormal presence of a catalyst 
 
  
 
Leak, entrainment from a nearby 
pipe or vessel (domino effect) 
 
   
Accidental contamination 
 
  
Presence of air vector Aeration 
 
   
Wind 
 
   
Gas escaping from a breach or leak 
(domino effect) 
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Air projection due to fall, collapse 
or explosion of a nearby 
equipment (domino effect) 
 
   
Exhaust gases 
 
  
Presence of liquid vector 
Liquid escaping from a leak or 
breach 
 
   
Extinction water 
 
   
Natural event 
 
   
Other water sources 
 
 
Oxygen Enrichment Presence of oxidizing substance Normal storage/use 
 
   
Abnormal storage/use 
 
   
Leak, entrainment from a nearby 
equipment (domino effect) 
 
   
Other accidental contamination 
 
 
Potentially mobile material Fragmented material 
  
  
Soluble material 
  
  
Material susceptible to emit 
vapours (e.g. solvent)   
 
Hazardous material storage Storage of a flammable product 
 
 
  
Storage of a reaction sensitive 
chemical   
  
Storage of a thermal 
decomposition sensitive chemical   
 
Hazardous material use Use of a highly reactive substance 
  
  
Use of an explosive material 
  
  
Use of a flammable substance 
  
 
 
Use of a toxic substance 
 
 
 Chemical missing Low level of catalyst 
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Lack of stabilizer/inhibitor 
  
  
Oxygen deficiency 
  
 
Incompatible material of 
construction    
 
Incorrect chemical 
concentration    
 
Unwanted chemical reaction Runaway reaction 
  
  
Decomposition 
  
  
Autoignition 
 
 
  
Spontaneous combustion Hypergolic liquids mixing 
 
  
Thermite reaction Al + Fe2O3  reaction 
 
  
Unwanted polymerization 
  
Equipment Failure 
Material of construction 
failure 
Brittle rupture Brittle structure 
 
   
Impact 
 
  
Degradation of the mechanical 
properties leads to incapacity to 
sustain high pressure 
Corrosion 
 
   
Erosion 
 
   
Fatigue 
 
   
Fracture Crack 
    
Creep 
   
Thermal weakening (lowering of 
the tensile or compressive stength 
under the effect of high 
temperature) 
 
   
Other chemical action of the 
environment (solvent on plastic 
structure)  
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Other physical action on the 
environment (light on plastics)  
 
  
Aging 
 
 
  
Rusting 
 
 
  
Stress 
 
 
  
Embrittlement 
 
  
Insufficient Initial mechanical 
properties of the structure 
(below normal use conditions) 
Inappropriate/insufficient material 
 
   
Inappropriate dimnensions 
 
   
Inappropriate assembling 
 
  
Excessive external stress Overloading 
 
   
High amplitude vibrations 
 
   
Dilation 
 
   
External overpressure 
 
   
Shear stress 
 
 
Instrumentation failure 
   
 
Control failure Computer system failure 
  
 
Equipment missing Open manhole 
  
 
Incorrect equipment installed 
   
 
Additional equipment 
installed 
insulating plate 
  
 
Electrical Equipment Failure Power supply failure 
  
  
Generator failure 
  
  
Motor failure 
  
  
Short circuit 
  
  
Lack of earthing 
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Spark 
  
  
Electric arc (defect of the electric 
installation, arc welding)   
 
Mechanical equipment failure Accidental opening Disconnect during filling 
 
   
Valve opened by mistake 
 
 
 
 
Valve left open by mistake 
 
 
 
 
External force causes accidental 
opening  
 
 
 
Valve blocked 
 
 
 
 
Seal, joint loss of effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
Safety valve, safety relief device 
 
 
 
 
Fail to clear out contents before 
opening containment  
 
 
 
Wrong part (containing hazardous 
material) worked on 
 
 
 
 
Operation started when 
containment open 
 
 
 
 
Uncontrolled flow during 
sampling/draining 
 
 
 
Leak Air leaking into system 
 
 
 
 Flange leak 
 
 
 
 Gasket leak  
 
 
 Joint leak  
 
 
 Relief valve Leak  
 
 
Blower failure 
 
 
 
 
Fittings failure Bolt failure  
 
 
 Bearing failure  
 
 
 Joint failure  
 
 
 Flange failure  
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 Flexible coupling failure  
 
 
 Gasket failure  
 
 
 Valve failure  
 
 
Hose failure 
 
 
 
 
Lining failure 
 
 
 
 
Pipeline failure 
 
 
 
 
Seal failure 
 
 
 
 
Tube failure 
 
 
 
 
Equipment misalignment 
 
 
 
 
Cooling tower collapse 
 
 
 
 
Floating roof failure 
 
 
 
 
Pump failure 
 
 
 
 
Refractory failure 
 
 
 
 
Shaft failure 
 
 
 
 
Tank failure 
 
 
 
 
Vessel failure 
 
 
 Safety Equipment failure Alarm failure 
 
 
 
 
Bursting Disc Failure 
 
 
 
 
Safety Relief Valve Failure 
 
 
 
 
Detection system failure 
 
 
 
Ignition source Fire (domino effect) 
 
 
  
Chemical energy (domino effect) 
  
  
Furnace, boiler, motor other 
unshielded hot surface   
  
Heat transport canalisation 
  
 
 
Magnifying glass 
 
 
 
 
Resisting electric conductor 
(resistance, short-circuit) 
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Friction 
 
 
 
 
Spark (mechanical) 
 
 
 
 
Spark (static electricity) 
 
 
 
 
Electric arc (defect of the electric 
installation, arc welding) 
 
 
 
 
Impact 
 
 
 
 
Combustion flame or heat 
 
 
 
 
Natural event (lightning) 
 
 
 
 
Hot missile (domino effect) 
 
 
 
Utility failure Air system failure 
 
 
 
 
Fuel supply failure Gas supply failure  
 
 
Hydraulic failure 
 
 
 
 
Inert gas supply failure Nitrogen supply failure  
 
 
Lubrication failure 
 
 
 
 
Power supply failure 
 
 
 
 
Steam failure 
 
 
 
 
Water failure 
 
 
Organizational Inadequate policy 
formulation  
  
 
 
Inadequate policy 
implementation 
Budget cuts 
 
 
 
 
Communication inadequacy 
 
 
 
 
Inadequate definition of line/staff 
responsibility 
 
 
 
Inadequate Process Safety 
Management 
Inadequate PHA 
  
 
 
Standards & codes requirement 
not followed 
  
 
 
Process Design review 
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Inspection\Maintenance planning 
  
 
 
Human factors (ergonomics) 
review 
  
 
 
Emergency shutdown provision 
  
 
 
Management of Change (MOC) 
provision 
  
 
 
Operational readiness Training & Performance Checks 
 
 
  
Pre Startup Safety Review (PSSR) 
 
 
  
Emergency provisions 
 
   Lockouts 
 
  
 
Permit to Work System Inadequate 
 
 
Audits & Corrective Actions 
 
 
 Human Error Operational error Slip (Attentional failure) Operator/Crew fatigue 
 
  
Lapse (Memory failure) 
  
  
Mistake (Lack of knowledge, 
faulty procedure)   
  
Violation (Intention failure) 
circumvention: 'does not happen 
to me' attitude  
   
Drug misuse 
 
   
Cigarette smoking 
 
  
Operation inadequate, wrong, 
unnecessary 
Inadequate cleaning 
 
  
 
Inadequate testing 
 
  
 
Inadequate identification 
 
  
 
Inadequate installation 
 
  
 
Inadequate inspection 
 
  
 
Incorrect labelling 
 
  
Operation Omitted Atmosphere not tested 
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Bund Drain left open 
 
 
Design error Inadequate design 
  
  
Inadequate standards applied Machinery not guarded 
 
 
Document error Inadequate documentation Map inadequate 
 
 
Maintenance/repair 
Inadequate isolation of 
equipment/system   
 
 
Inadequate maintenance work 
operation   
 
 
Damage caused by maintenance 
work   
 
Procedure error Faulty instructions 
 
 
 
 
Incorrect cleaning procedure 
  
 
 
Inadequate maintenance 
procedure   
 
 
Safety procedures inadequate 
  
 Shift change Inadequate communication   
 Tool unsatisfactory    
External Events Deliberate acts Arson 
  
  
Terrorism 
  
  
Vandalism 
  
  
Sabotage 
  
  
War Bomb 
 
   
Missile 
 
 
External aggression Plane Crash 
  
  
Transportation accident Road incidents 
 
   
Rail incidents 
 
   
Shipping incidents 
 
   
Plane crash 
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Domino Effect Fire (domino effect) 
 
   
Chemical energy (domino effect) 
 
   
Hot missile (domino effect) 
 
  
Excessive vibration 
  
  
Friction heat 
  
 
Natural Phenomenon Weather effects Rain 
 
   
Snow 
 
   
Ice 
 
   
Lightning 
 
   
Wind, gale, storm 
 
  
Avalanche 
  
  
Earth movements 
  
  
Flooding Lifting of tanks 
 
   
fracture of pipelines 
 
Other 
    
Initiating Event Design Related 
   
 
Operations Related 
   
 
Maintenance 
   
 
Other Factors 
   
 
Metal Fatigue 
   
 
Corrosion 
   
 
Embrittlement 
   
 
Vibration 
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Consequences Taxonomy 
People Fatality 
 
 
 
Injuries Bruises/fractures  
 
 
Asphyxiation  
  Electric Shock  
  Scalding/burning  
  Poisoning  
  Radioactive  
 
Evacuation 
 
 
 
At risk 
 
 
Environment Ecological damage Air 
 
 
 
Water 
 
 
 
Soil 
 
 
 
Flora 
 
 
 
Fauna 
 Plant/Property/Equipment Plant shutdown 
 
 
 
Damage to 
equipment/installation 
 
 
 
Boilover 
 
 
 
Capsize of platform 
 
 
 
Leak/Rupture Pipe leak/rupture 
 
  
Tank leak/rupture 
 
 
Collapse Vessel collapse 
 
  
Tankroof collapse 
 
 
Blowout 
  
 
Vessel overturned 
 
 
 
Contamination of product 
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Product loss 
 
 
Fire Liquid substance fire Poolfire 
 
  
Tank fire 
Boilover and resulting 
poolfire 
  Conflagration 
 
  
Toxic cloud 
 
  
Ecological damage 
 
 
Two-phase substance fire Jetfire 
 
  
Poolfire 
 
  
Flashfire 
 
  
Fireball (often after 
BLEVE) 
 
  
Conflagration 
 
  
Toxic cloud 
 
  
Ecological damage 
 
 
Gas/vapor substance fire Flashfire 
 
 
 
Conflagration 
 
 
 
Toxic cloud 
 
 
 
Ecological damage 
 Implosion 
 
 
 
Explosion Physical Explosion 
Compressed gas/vapor 
explosion 
Overpressure generation 
   
Missiles ejection 
  
BLEVE Heat radiation 
   
Overpressure generation 
   
Missiles ejection 
  
Rapid phase transition 
explosion 
Overpressure generation 
 
Chemical Explosion Vapor Cloud Explosion Heat radiation  
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Overpressure generation 
  
Aerosol explosion Heat radiation 
   
Overpressure generation 
  
Gas explosion Heat radiation 
   
Overpressure generation 
   
Missiles ejection 
  
Dust explosion Heat radiation 
   
Overpressure generation 
   
Missiles ejection 
  
Condensed phase 
explosion 
Overpressure generation 
  
 
Missiles ejection                    
  
 
Heat radiation  
  
Runaway reaction and 
explosion 
Overpressure generation              
   
Missiles ejection  
   
Toxic release 
Internal fire/explosion 
 
 
 
Release of Substance Toxic gas/vapor release Contamination 
 
 
Flammable gas/vapor 
release 
Gas/vapor substance fire 
 
  
Explosion 
 
 
Liquid/solid release to Air polluting spill 
 
 
Liquid/solid release to 
Water 
polluting spill 
 
 
Liquid/solid release to 
Ground 
polluting spill 
 
Near miss 
 
 
 
Transport effect Collision 
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Sinking 
 
 
 
Derailment-consequence 
 
 
Other 
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Layers of Protection (LOP) Taxonomy 
Prevention Inherently safer Design 
 
 
 Mechanical Integrity  
 
 
Preventive barriers Inerting   
  Coating  
 
Safety Management System Management of Change 
 
  
Procedures 
 
  
Safety Culture 
 
  
Periodic Inspection 
 
  
Maintenance 
 
  
Training 
 
 
Basic Process Control 
System (BPCS) 
Software driven steering 
of process 
 
 
Operator  Action 
Supervision/Interven-tion 
on Alarms 
 
 
Back-up system 
 
 
 
Security System 
 
 
Protection Facility spacing and layout 
 
 
 
Detection system, alarms 
and operator intervention  
 
 
Supervisor Intervention 
 
 
 
Automatic SIS system 
Detector, processor, 
actuator combination 
explosion 
suppression 
   
isolation valve 
closing 
 
Isolation system Fast acting valve  
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rotary valve  
 
  
flame arrester 
 
 
Physical Protection Double Containment 
 
  
Relief Valve 
 
 
Ignition Control 
Electrical Area 
Classification 
 
 Static electricity, lightning, 
and stray current protection 
  Mitigation Active Systems Fire Suppression Sprinkler 
   Deluge system 
   Foam system 
   Fire extinguishers 
  
Explosion vents 
 
  
Water curtains 
 
  
Steam curtains 
 
 
Passive Systems 
Personal Protection 
Equipment 
 
  
Dike/Bund/catchment 
 
  
Containment and 
Drainage 
 
  
Fireproofing/firewall 
 
  
Sufficient 
spacing/distance to risk 
source 
Facility spacing and 
layout 
 
Community/Plant 
Emergency Response 
Decontamination 
 
  
Fire Extinction 
 
 
 
 
1
57
 
  
Emergency shutdown 
 
  
Rescue possibilities 
 
  
Access routes, water 
 
  
Gas detection/ dispersion 
prediction 
 
 
External fire & rescue 
service 
Fire fighting 
 
  
Medical treatment 
 
  
Repair of equipment 
 
  
Evacuation 
 
 
 
 
1
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Recommendations & Actions Taxonomy 
Changes to design 
Improve protection of 
equipment/piping/valve 
 
Software-driven steering of process 
 
Adaptation of material of construction for 
equipment to substance properties 
 
Inherently safer design 
Changes to maintenance  procedures 
 
Changes to operating procedures 
 
Better observation of procedures 
 
Better training of 
operators/maintenance 
workers/supervisors 
 
Changes to raw 
materials/solvents/catalysts  
Changes to codes/standards 
 
Changes to company culture 
 
Better safety management 
 
Installation shutdown 
 
Under investigation 
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APPENDIX E 
The following are the codes used for developing the search system: 
Code for the word search: 
public class HelloLucene { 
    private Directory index; 
    private IndexWriter w; 
    private static boolean flag = false; 
 
    //The function which does the indexing of the text files 
    public void doIndexing() { 
        try { 
            index = new RAMDirectory(); 
            w = new IndexWriter(index, new StandardAnalyzer(), true, new MaxFieldLength(25000)); 
            File directory = new File("D:\\work\\txt"); 
            if (directory.isDirectory()) { 
                File[] filesInDirectory = directory.listFiles(); 
                for (int i = 0; i < filesInDirectory.length; i++) { 
                    File file = filesInDirectory[i]; 
                    if (file.getName().endsWith(".txt")) { 
                        String contents = ""; 
                        BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(file)); 
                        String line = reader.readLine(); 
                        while (line != null) { 
                            contents += line; 
                            line = reader.readLine(); 
                        } 
                        addDoc(w, contents, file.getName()); 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
            w.close(); 
        } 
        catch (Exception e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
    } 
     
    //The function which does the actual Searching. 
    public String doSearch(String queryString) throws CorruptIndexException, 
                                    LockObtainFailedException, IOException, 
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                                    ParseException { 
        if (!flag) { 
            doIndexing(); 
            flag = true; 
        } 
        queryString = "\"" + queryString + "\""; 
        Query q = new QueryParser("title", new StandardAnalyzer()).parse(queryString); 
        IndexSearcher s = new IndexSearcher(index); 
        TopDocs docs = s.search(q, null, 800); 
        ScoreDoc [] hits = docs.scoreDocs; 
        String returnString = ""; 
        for(ScoreDoc scoreDoc : hits) { 
            String fileName = s.doc(scoreDoc.doc).get("name"); 
            returnString += fileName.substring(0, fileName.indexOf(".")) + "@@@"; 
        } 
        s.close(); 
        return returnString; 
    } 
     
    private void addDoc(IndexWriter w, String value, String name) throws IOException { 
        Document doc = new Document(); 
        doc.add(new Field("title", value, Field.Store.YES, Field.Index.ANALYZED)); 
        doc.add(new Field("name", name, Field.Store.YES, Field.Index.ANALYZED)); 
        w.addDocument(doc); 
    } 
} 
 
Program to create the folder search tree: 
public class WebServiceTest { 
    private static String excelContents = ""; 
     
 //Reads an Excel file to create a Folder tree. 
    public String readExcelFile() { 
        if (excelContents.length() > 10) { 
            return excelContents; 
        } 
        String fileName = "D:\\1.xls"; 
        File file = new File(fileName); 
        Workbook workbook; 
        Sheet sheet; 
        String returnValue = ""; 
        String divider = ""; 
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        try { 
            workbook = Workbook.getWorkbook(file); 
            int numSheets = workbook.getNumberOfSheets(); 
            for (int k = 0; k < numSheets; k++) { 
                String sheetNumber = "#LEVELZERO#"; 
                sheet = workbook.getSheet(k); 
                returnValue += sheetNumber + sheet.getName(); 
                for (int i = 0; i < sheet.getRows(); i++) { 
                    for (int j = 0; j < sheet.getColumns(); j++){ 
                        divider = "#LEVEL"; 
                        switch (j) { 
                        case 0: 
                            divider += "ONE#"; 
                            break; 
                        case 1: 
                            divider += "TWO#"; 
                            break; 
                        case 2: 
                            divider += "THREE#"; 
                            break; 
                        case 3: 
                            divider += "FOUR#"; 
                            break; 
                        case 4: 
                            divider += "FIVE#"; 
                            break; 
                        case 5: 
                            divider += "SIX#"; 
                            break; 
                        case 6: 
                            divider += "SEVEN#"; 
                            break; 
                        } 
                        if (sheet.getCell(j, i).getContents() != null 
                            && sheet.getCell(j, i).getContents().length() > 0){ 
                                returnValue += divider + sheet.getCell(j, i).getContents(); 
                            } 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
        } catch (IOException e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } catch (BiffException e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
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        excelContents = returnValue; 
        return returnValue; 
    } 
} 
 
 
 
Code for word search within a folder: 
public class InFolderWordSearch { 
    private String[] getFiles(String fileNamesList) { 
        String[] returnList = fileNamesList.split(":")[1].split(","); 
        for (int i = 0; i < returnList.length; i++) { 
            returnList[i] = returnList[i].trim(); 
        } 
        return returnList; 
    } 
     
    private Directory index; 
    private IndexWriter w; 
 //Function to index the required files 
    private void indexFiles(String[] fileNamesList) { 
        try { 
            index = new RAMDirectory(); 
            w = new IndexWriter(index, new StandardAnalyzer(), true, new MaxFieldLength(25000)); 
            for (int i = 0; i < fileNamesList.length; i++) { 
                File file = new File("D:\\work\\txt\\" + fileNamesList[i] + ".txt"); 
                String contents = ""; 
                BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(file)); 
                String line = reader.readLine(); 
                while (line != null) { 
                    contents += line; 
                    line = reader.readLine(); 
                } 
                addDoc(w, contents, file.getName()); 
            } 
            w.close(); 
        } 
        catch (Exception e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
    } 
     
    private void addDoc(IndexWriter w, String value, String name) throws IOException { 
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        Document doc = new Document(); 
        doc.add(new Field("title", value, Field.Store.YES, Field.Index.ANALYZED)); 
        doc.add(new Field("name", name, Field.Store.YES, Field.Index.ANALYZED)); 
        w.addDocument(doc); 
    } 
     
 //Main function - uses the index to do a query and return the results 
    public String returnInFolderSearchResults(String queryString, String selectedItem) { 
        queryString = "\"" + queryString + "\""; 
        String returnString = ""; 
        try { 
            File file = new File("D:\\8.xls"); 
            Workbook wb = Workbook.getWorkbook(file); 
            Sheet sheet = wb.getSheet(0); 
            int numRows = sheet.getRows(); 
            for (int i = 0; i < numRows; i++) { 
                String data = sheet.getCell(0, i).getContents(); 
                if (data.equalsIgnoreCase(selectedItem)) { 
                    String fileNamesList = sheet.getCell(0, i).getCellFeatures().getComment(); 
                    String[] fileNames = getFiles(fileNamesList); 
                    indexFiles(fileNames); 
                    Query q = new QueryParser("title", new StandardAnalyzer()).parse(queryString); 
                    IndexSearcher s = new IndexSearcher(index); 
                    TopDocs docs = s.search(q, null, 100); 
                    ScoreDoc [] hits = docs.scoreDocs; 
                    for(ScoreDoc scoreDoc : hits) { 
                        returnString += fileName.substring(0, fileName.indexOf(".")) + "@@@"; 
                    } 
                    s.close(); 
                    break; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        catch (Exception e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return returnString; 
    } 
} 
 
Code to read MARS pages and save them as html and text files: 
public class ReadAllWebPages { 
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 //Function to save all the MARS database files as TEXT files into the hard disk (these 
files are used for indexing purposes) 
    public void ReadAllTXT() { 
        File file = new File("D:\\3.xls");         
        try { 
            Workbook wb = Workbook.getWorkbook(file); 
            Sheet sheet = wb.getSheet(0); 
            int rows = sheet.getRows(); 
            String data; 
            String writeFileName; 
            for (int i = 1; i < rows; i++) { 
                writeFileName = "D:\\work\\txt\\"; 
                data = sheet.getCell(0, i).getContents(); 
                writeFileName += data + ".txt"; 
                returnFileContents(data, writeFileName); 
            } 
        } 
        catch (Exception e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
    } 
     
 //Function to save all the MARS database files onto the hard disk. 
    public void readAllHTML() { 
        File file = new File("D:\\3.xls"); 
        try { 
            Workbook wb = Workbook.getWorkbook(file); 
            Sheet sheet = wb.getSheet(0); 
            int rows = sheet.getRows(); 
            String data; 
            String writeFileName; 
            for (int i = 1; i < rows; i++) { 
                writeFileName = "D:\\work\\html\\"; 
                data = sheet.getCell(0, i).getContents(); 
                writeFileName += data + ".html"; 
                returnFileContents(data, writeFileName); 
            } 
        } 
        catch (Exception e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
    } 
     
    public String returnFileContents(String sNum, String writeFileName) { 
        String urlString  
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            = "http://mahb-
srv.jrc.it/typo3/fileadmin/eMARS_Site/PhpPages/ViewAccident/ViewAccidentPublic.php?accid
ent_code=" + sNum; 
        try { 
            URL url = new URL(urlString); 
            BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new 
InputStreamReader(url.openStream())); 
            String line, page = ""; 
            line = reader.readLine(); 
            while (line != null) { 
                page += line + " "; 
                line = reader.readLine(); 
            } 
            reader.close(); 
            File writeFile; 
            writeFile = new File(writeFileName); 
            BufferedWriter writer =  
                new BufferedWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(new FileOutputStream(writeFile))); 
            writer.write(page); 
            writer.close(); 
        } 
        catch (Exception e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return null; 
    } 
     
    private String output = ""; 
 //Recursive Function, which goes through all the nodes and finds only the needed ones. 
 public int findChildrenRecursively(Node node, int level) { 
            NodeList nodeList = node.getChildren(); 
            String temp; 
            if (node.getChildren() == null) { 
                String text = node.getText().trim(); 
                text = text.replaceAll("&nbsp;", " "); 
                text = text.trim(); 
                if (text.endsWith("-->") && text.startsWith("<!--")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.startsWith("<!--")) { 
                    text = text.substring(text.lastIndexOf("EN-GB") + 7); 
                } 
                if (text.contains("clearpixel.gif")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.equalsIgnoreCase("b")) 
                    return level; 
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                if (text.startsWith("<div")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.startsWith("td id=") || text.startsWith("td class=")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.equalsIgnoreCase("br")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.equalsIgnoreCase("strong")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.equalsIgnoreCase("td")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.equalsIgnoreCase("</div>")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.contains("!DOCTYPE")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.startsWith("link rel")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.equalsIgnoreCase("title")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.equalsIgnoreCase("&nbsp;")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.startsWith("[if ")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.equalsIgnoreCase("em")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.equalsIgnoreCase("body")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.equalsIgnoreCase("[endif]")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.startsWith("table border=")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.startsWith("<style ")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.startsWith("BODY {")) 
                    return level; 
                if (text.startsWith("img src=")) 
                    return level; 
                output += text + " "; 
                return level; 
            } 
            for (int i = 0; i < nodeList.size(); i++) { 
                Node tempNode = nodeList.elementAt(i); 
                temp = tempNode.getText().trim(); 
                if (temp.startsWith("meta")) 
                    continue; 
                if (!temp.equals("") && !(temp.charAt(0) == '/')) { 
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                    level += 1; 
                    findChildrenRecursively(tempNode, level); 
                    level -= 1; 
                } 
            } 
            return level; 
        } 
} 
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APPENDIX F 
The user interface (UI) screen shots for the database search system are shown here. 
 
Figure F. 1 UI for the word search showing search results for sodium hypochlorite. 
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Figure F. 2 Screenshot of pop up window of incident information after clicking on one of the word search results. 
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Figure F. 3. UI of clickable folders in the folder search system. 
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In Figure F.3, the ‘plus’ tab left of the node is for unfolding the node. The node that looks like a button are linked to ARAMIS 
fault tree screens. The number in parenthesis on the right hand side of each node is the number of items to the next level. 
 
Figure F. 4 Screen shot of pop up window for clickable ARAMIS fault tree linked to causes taxonomy. 
 
 
 
1
7
2
 
Figure F.4 shows the screen shot of part of the ARAMIS fault tree pop up window, when the user clicked on the button of 
Internal overpressure (Gas material) node. 
 
Figure F. 5 Screen shot of results of a word search within a folder. 
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In Figure F.5, the links in the little pop up window are incident files that are clickable to pop up incident information. 
 
Figure F. 6 Screenshot of a blank word search on a folder to retrieve all records within that folder (Chemical Causes)
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